Ownership and First-Person Authority from a Normative Pragmatist Perspective
Lo Presti, Patrizio LU
(2020)
In Contemporary Pragmatism
17(4).
p.268-285
- Abstract
- Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I’m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason... (More)
- Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I’m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4). (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/0ce48cb1-e687-48d9-b3aa-3bcfcd310479
- author
- Lo Presti, Patrizio
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2020
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- first-person authority, normativity, pragmatism, mental content, ownership
- in
- Contemporary Pragmatism
- volume
- 17
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 268 - 285
- publisher
- Brill
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85098090267
- ISSN
- 1875-8185
- DOI
- 10.1163/18758185-17040004
- project
- A dispute on the rationale for methodological individualism
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 0ce48cb1-e687-48d9-b3aa-3bcfcd310479
- date added to LUP
- 2020-09-30 11:57:58
- date last changed
- 2023-04-10 21:09:30
@article{0ce48cb1-e687-48d9-b3aa-3bcfcd310479,
abstract = {{Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I’m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4).}},
author = {{Lo Presti, Patrizio}},
issn = {{1875-8185}},
keywords = {{first-person authority; normativity; pragmatism; mental content; ownership}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{4}},
pages = {{268--285}},
publisher = {{Brill}},
series = {{Contemporary Pragmatism}},
title = {{Ownership and First-Person Authority from a Normative Pragmatist Perspective}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-17040004}},
doi = {{10.1163/18758185-17040004}},
volume = {{17}},
year = {{2020}},
}