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Strategy-Proof Allocation of Multiple Public Goods

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU and Torstensson, Pär LU (2005) In Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Abstract
We characterize the set of strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. The set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set with a finite number of elements. We do not require the SCFs to be ‘onto’, but instead impose the weaker requirement that every element in each category of public goods is attained at some preference profile. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. We find that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial in each... (More)
We characterize the set of strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. The set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set with a finite number of elements. We do not require the SCFs to be ‘onto’, but instead impose the weaker requirement that every element in each category of public goods is attained at some preference profile. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. We find that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial in each component of the range. If the range cannot be decomposed at all, the SCF is dictatorial in spite of the separability assumption on preferences, and a form of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Working Paper
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Strategy-proof, multiple public goods, decomposabi
in
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
issue
2005:3
pages
16 pages
publisher
S-WoPEc. Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
bee09bdd-f917-4210-ab99-d68107e6403e (old id 1028541)
alternative location
http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2005_003.htm
date added to LUP
2008-09-11 14:40:55
date last changed
2016-10-07 16:49:28
@misc{bee09bdd-f917-4210-ab99-d68107e6403e,
  abstract     = {We characterize the set of strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. The set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set with a finite number of elements. We do not require the SCFs to be ‘onto’, but instead impose the weaker requirement that every element in each category of public goods is attained at some preference profile. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. We find that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial in each component of the range. If the range cannot be decomposed at all, the SCF is dictatorial in spite of the separability assumption on preferences, and a form of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained.},
  author       = {Svensson, Lars-Gunnar and Torstensson, Pär},
  keyword      = {Strategy-proof,multiple public goods,decomposabi},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Working Paper},
  number       = {2005:3},
  pages        = {16},
  publisher    = {S-WoPEc. Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics},
  series       = {Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University},
  title        = {Strategy-Proof Allocation of Multiple Public Goods},
  year         = {2005},
}