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The family as the health producer--when spouses act strategically.

Bolin, Kristian LU ; Jacobson, Lena and Lindgren, Björn LU (2002) In Journal of Health Economics 21(3). p.475-495
Abstract
The Grossman model has been extended recently in order to take account of the fact that most people lead their lives in a family--using frameworks in which family members, respectively, (a) have common preferences and (b) are Nash-bargainers. These models, however, do not consider individual incentives for behaving strategically. In the model presented in this paper, spouses interact strategically both in the production of own health and in the production of health of other family members. We analyse, inter alia, the impact on the distribution of health of changes in family policies, such as child allowance and custody rules.
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organization
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Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Investments : statistics & numerical data, Investments : economics, Human, Health Services Needs and Demand : statistics & numerical data, Health Services Needs and Demand : economics, Health Behavior, Female, Family Health, Efficiency, Divorce : economics, Decision Making, Child, Conflict of Interest, Child Welfare : economics, Male, Models, Econometric, Patient Acceptance of Health Care : statistics & numerical data, Spouses : psychology, Adult
in
Journal of Health Economics
volume
21
issue
3
pages
475 - 495
publisher
Elsevier
external identifiers
  • pmid:12022269
  • wos:000175204800007
  • scopus:0036221457
ISSN
1879-1646
DOI
10.1016/S0167-6296(01)00135-7
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
665e5aa2-a0ab-4235-b4e3-2909c3472c95 (old id 108352)
date added to LUP
2007-07-20 14:16:59
date last changed
2017-02-26 03:33:20
@article{665e5aa2-a0ab-4235-b4e3-2909c3472c95,
  abstract     = {The Grossman model has been extended recently in order to take account of the fact that most people lead their lives in a family--using frameworks in which family members, respectively, (a) have common preferences and (b) are Nash-bargainers. These models, however, do not consider individual incentives for behaving strategically. In the model presented in this paper, spouses interact strategically both in the production of own health and in the production of health of other family members. We analyse, inter alia, the impact on the distribution of health of changes in family policies, such as child allowance and custody rules.},
  author       = {Bolin, Kristian and Jacobson, Lena and Lindgren, Björn},
  issn         = {1879-1646},
  keyword      = {Investments : statistics & numerical data,Investments : economics,Human,Health Services Needs and Demand : statistics & numerical data,Health Services Needs and Demand : economics,Health Behavior,Female,Family Health,Efficiency,Divorce : economics,Decision Making,Child,Conflict of Interest,Child Welfare : economics,Male,Models,Econometric,Patient Acceptance of Health Care : statistics & numerical data,Spouses : psychology,Adult},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {475--495},
  publisher    = {Elsevier},
  series       = {Journal of Health Economics},
  title        = {The family as the health producer--when spouses act strategically.},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6296(01)00135-7},
  volume       = {21},
  year         = {2002},
}