Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
(2008) In Mathematical Social Sciences 56(3). p.350-354- Abstract
- This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, Under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1305499
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2008
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Coalitionally strategy-proofness, Fairness, Indivisibles
- in
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- volume
- 56
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 350 - 354
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000261291100005
- scopus:54049121746
- ISSN
- 0165-4896
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.004
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 490958cc-bf0a-45ed-8da2-29b99049d8e9 (old id 1305499)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 14:22:43
- date last changed
- 2022-01-28 00:18:42
@article{490958cc-bf0a-45ed-8da2-29b99049d8e9, abstract = {{This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, Under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}}, author = {{Andersson, Tommy and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar}}, issn = {{0165-4896}}, keywords = {{Coalitionally strategy-proofness; Fairness; Indivisibles}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{350--354}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, series = {{Mathematical Social Sciences}}, title = {{Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.004}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.004}}, volume = {{56}}, year = {{2008}}, }