Coalitional strategyproofness and fairness
(2009) In Economic Theory 40(2). p.227245 Abstract
 This paper considers the problem of assigning a finite number of indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., to the same number of individuals. There is also a divisible good (money) and the individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategyproof in the strong sense that no coalition of individuals can improve the allocation for all of its members, by misrepresenting their preferences, is characterized. It turns out that given a regularity condition, the outcome of a fair and coalitionally strategyproof allocation rule must maximize the use of money subject to upper quantity bounds determined by the allocation rule. If available money is nonnegative, objects may be jobs and... (More)
 This paper considers the problem of assigning a finite number of indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., to the same number of individuals. There is also a divisible good (money) and the individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategyproof in the strong sense that no coalition of individuals can improve the allocation for all of its members, by misrepresenting their preferences, is characterized. It turns out that given a regularity condition, the outcome of a fair and coalitionally strategyproof allocation rule must maximize the use of money subject to upper quantity bounds determined by the allocation rule. If available money is nonnegative, objects may be jobs and the distribution of money a wage structure. If available money is negative, the formal model may reflect a multiobject auction. In both cases fairness means equilibrium, i.e., that each individual receives a most demanded object. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1443966
 author
 Svensson, LarsGunnar ^{LU}
 organization
 publishing date
 2009
 type
 Contribution to journal
 publication status
 published
 subject
 keywords
 Multiobject auction, Wages, Coalitional strategyproofness, Indivisibilities, Fairness
 in
 Economic Theory
 volume
 40
 issue
 2
 pages
 227  245
 publisher
 Springer
 external identifiers

 wos:000266655300004
 scopus:67349131629
 ISSN
 14320479
 DOI
 10.1007/s0019900803664
 language
 English
 LU publication?
 yes
 id
 635d1647e11a4adbaf70210d467abc57 (old id 1443966)
 date added to LUP
 20160401 11:38:06
 date last changed
 20210825 01:20:49
@article{635d1647e11a4adbaf70210d467abc57, abstract = {This paper considers the problem of assigning a finite number of indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., to the same number of individuals. There is also a divisible good (money) and the individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategyproof in the strong sense that no coalition of individuals can improve the allocation for all of its members, by misrepresenting their preferences, is characterized. It turns out that given a regularity condition, the outcome of a fair and coalitionally strategyproof allocation rule must maximize the use of money subject to upper quantity bounds determined by the allocation rule. If available money is nonnegative, objects may be jobs and the distribution of money a wage structure. If available money is negative, the formal model may reflect a multiobject auction. In both cases fairness means equilibrium, i.e., that each individual receives a most demanded object.}, author = {Svensson, LarsGunnar}, issn = {14320479}, language = {eng}, number = {2}, pages = {227245}, publisher = {Springer}, series = {Economic Theory}, title = {Coalitional strategyproofness and fairness}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s0019900803664}, doi = {10.1007/s0019900803664}, volume = {40}, year = {2009}, }