The Demand for Information Services and the Market Structure
(2002) In Journal of Economics 77(2). p.155-183- Abstract
- Uninformed buyers' demand for statistical screening between privately informed sellers is studied in a fixed price market. A single buyer will screen more extensively than would two or more buyers, since in the latter case buyers realize that sellers will be attracted to buyers with the most favorable screening policy (i.e., not to screen at all). This result is robust to some but not all types of modifications in the model. For instance, information quality differences in the sense of Blackwell will reinforce this effect. Furthermore, in equilibrium only the best information service will be used.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1384660
- author
- Holm, Jerker LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2002
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- screening, information service, market behavior
- in
- Journal of Economics
- volume
- 77
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 155 - 183
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:0036862709
- ISSN
- 1617-7134
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00712-002-0540-2
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- d56a2e6f-2a45-426d-ba3c-a6bfe58cd0e8 (old id 1384660)
- alternative location
- http://www.jstor.org/stable/41794990
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 15:35:10
- date last changed
- 2022-02-12 08:38:17
@article{d56a2e6f-2a45-426d-ba3c-a6bfe58cd0e8,
abstract = {{Uninformed buyers' demand for statistical screening between privately informed sellers is studied in a fixed price market. A single buyer will screen more extensively than would two or more buyers, since in the latter case buyers realize that sellers will be attracted to buyers with the most favorable screening policy (i.e., not to screen at all). This result is robust to some but not all types of modifications in the model. For instance, information quality differences in the sense of Blackwell will reinforce this effect. Furthermore, in equilibrium only the best information service will be used.}},
author = {{Holm, Jerker}},
issn = {{1617-7134}},
keywords = {{screening; information service; market behavior}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{155--183}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Journal of Economics}},
title = {{The Demand for Information Services and the Market Structure}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-002-0540-2}},
doi = {{10.1007/s00712-002-0540-2}},
volume = {{77}},
year = {{2002}},
}