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Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness

Andersson, Tommy LU (2008) In Review of Economic Design 11. p.321-338
Abstract
This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair (as in envy-free) allocation is not generally guaranteed, due to the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. This paper defines an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, under a mild regulatory condition and quasi-linear utility functions, it is demonstrated that this is the only coalitionally strategy-proof... (More)
This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair (as in envy-free) allocation is not generally guaranteed, due to the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. This paper defines an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, under a mild regulatory condition and quasi-linear utility functions, it is demonstrated that this is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Indivisibles, fairness, weak fairness, strategy-pr
in
Review of Economic Design
volume
11
pages
321 - 338
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • Scopus:39149141862
ISSN
1434-4742
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
7ff8fdaa-33e8-4534-8f62-94ca302cb4d0 (old id 1385257)
date added to LUP
2009-04-20 12:27:16
date last changed
2017-01-01 07:57:08
@article{7ff8fdaa-33e8-4534-8f62-94ca302cb4d0,
  abstract     = {This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair (as in envy-free) allocation is not generally guaranteed, due to the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. This paper defines an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, under a mild regulatory condition and quasi-linear utility functions, it is demonstrated that this is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation.},
  author       = {Andersson, Tommy},
  issn         = {1434-4742},
  keyword      = {Indivisibles,fairness,weak fairness,strategy-pr},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {321--338},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Review of Economic Design},
  title        = {Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness},
  volume       = {11},
  year         = {2008},
}