Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness
(2008) In Review of Economic Design 11. p.321-338- Abstract
- This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair (as in envy-free) allocation is not generally guaranteed, due to the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. This paper defines an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, under a mild regulatory condition and quasi-linear utility functions, it is demonstrated that this is the only coalitionally strategy-proof... (More)
- This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair (as in envy-free) allocation is not generally guaranteed, due to the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. This paper defines an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, under a mild regulatory condition and quasi-linear utility functions, it is demonstrated that this is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1385257
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2008
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Indivisibles, fairness, weak fairness, strategy-pr
- in
- Review of Economic Design
- volume
- 11
- pages
- 321 - 338
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:39149141862
- ISSN
- 1434-4742
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 7ff8fdaa-33e8-4534-8f62-94ca302cb4d0 (old id 1385257)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 10:17:31
- date last changed
- 2022-01-29 20:04:30
@article{7ff8fdaa-33e8-4534-8f62-94ca302cb4d0, abstract = {{This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair (as in envy-free) allocation is not generally guaranteed, due to the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. This paper defines an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, under a mild regulatory condition and quasi-linear utility functions, it is demonstrated that this is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation.}}, author = {{Andersson, Tommy}}, issn = {{1434-4742}}, keywords = {{Indivisibles; fairness; weak fairness; strategy-pr}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{321--338}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, series = {{Review of Economic Design}}, title = {{Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness}}, volume = {{11}}, year = {{2008}}, }