Genetic Information and Investment in Human Capital
(1997) In Journal of Health Economics 16(4). p.435-452- Abstract
- In a game of incomplete information we analyze the consequences of giving an employer access to imperfect genetic information about his employees. The employer chooses whether to invest in the employee and the employee chooses a life style. We derive the condition for markets of information services to exist and the conditions for when it is beneficial to the various parties. In one specification of the game, the mere introduction of the information service may change the employee's choice of health behavior, which means that the value of genetic information may be negative to the employer.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1387257
- author
- Holm, Jerker LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 1997
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Bayesian equilibrium, Genetic tests, Informativeness, Value of information
- in
- Journal of Health Economics
- volume
- 16
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 435 - 452
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:0030748380
- ISSN
- 1879-1646
- DOI
- 10.1016/S0167-6296(96)00513-9
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 05242a92-44bf-4f81-97a5-32ef3d9b5361 (old id 1387257)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 12:32:09
- date last changed
- 2022-01-27 06:27:25
@article{05242a92-44bf-4f81-97a5-32ef3d9b5361, abstract = {{In a game of incomplete information we analyze the consequences of giving an employer access to imperfect genetic information about his employees. The employer chooses whether to invest in the employee and the employee chooses a life style. We derive the condition for markets of information services to exist and the conditions for when it is beneficial to the various parties. In one specification of the game, the mere introduction of the information service may change the employee's choice of health behavior, which means that the value of genetic information may be negative to the employer.}}, author = {{Holm, Jerker}}, issn = {{1879-1646}}, keywords = {{Bayesian equilibrium; Genetic tests; Informativeness; Value of information}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{435--452}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, series = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, title = {{Genetic Information and Investment in Human Capital}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6296(96)00513-9}}, doi = {{10.1016/S0167-6296(96)00513-9}}, volume = {{16}}, year = {{1997}}, }