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Genetic Information and Investment in Human Capital

Holm, Jerker LU (1997) In Journal of Health Economics 16(4). p.435-452
Abstract
In a game of incomplete information we analyze the consequences of giving an employer access to imperfect genetic information about his employees. The employer chooses whether to invest in the employee and the employee chooses a life style. We derive the condition for markets of information services to exist and the conditions for when it is beneficial to the various parties. In one specification of the game, the mere introduction of the information service may change the employee's choice of health behavior, which means that the value of genetic information may be negative to the employer.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Bayesian equilibrium, Genetic tests, Informativeness, Value of information
in
Journal of Health Economics
volume
16
issue
4
pages
435 - 452
publisher
Elsevier
external identifiers
  • scopus:0030748380
ISSN
1879-1646
DOI
10.1016/S0167-6296(96)00513-9
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
05242a92-44bf-4f81-97a5-32ef3d9b5361 (old id 1387257)
date added to LUP
2009-04-20 12:27:25
date last changed
2017-07-30 03:52:46
@article{05242a92-44bf-4f81-97a5-32ef3d9b5361,
  abstract     = {In a game of incomplete information we analyze the consequences of giving an employer access to imperfect genetic information about his employees. The employer chooses whether to invest in the employee and the employee chooses a life style. We derive the condition for markets of information services to exist and the conditions for when it is beneficial to the various parties. In one specification of the game, the mere introduction of the information service may change the employee's choice of health behavior, which means that the value of genetic information may be negative to the employer.},
  author       = {Holm, Jerker},
  issn         = {1879-1646},
  keyword      = {Bayesian equilibrium,Genetic tests,Informativeness,Value of information},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {435--452},
  publisher    = {Elsevier},
  series       = {Journal of Health Economics},
  title        = {Genetic Information and Investment in Human Capital},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6296(96)00513-9},
  volume       = {16},
  year         = {1997},
}