Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?
(2002) In West European Politics 25(1). p.23-46- Abstract
- Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, the article argues that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating... (More)
- Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, the article argues that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating or obstructing attempts by the institutions to implement private agendas; and (4) the consequences of previous rounds of delegation affect future delegation, institutional design, and interaction, through positive and negative feed-back loops. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/156367
- author
- Tallberg, Jonas LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2002
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Internationell politik, Politik i Europa
- in
- West European Politics
- volume
- 25
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 23 - 46
- publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:0036168697
- ISSN
- 0140-2382
- DOI
- 10.1080/713601584
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 13c67bdf-8ab8-41c1-be1a-40b1f0bdb4dc (old id 156367)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 16:44:03
- date last changed
- 2022-04-23 00:06:38
@article{13c67bdf-8ab8-41c1-be1a-40b1f0bdb4dc,
abstract = {{Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, the article argues that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating or obstructing attempts by the institutions to implement private agendas; and (4) the consequences of previous rounds of delegation affect future delegation, institutional design, and interaction, through positive and negative feed-back loops.}},
author = {{Tallberg, Jonas}},
issn = {{0140-2382}},
keywords = {{Internationell politik; Politik i Europa}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{23--46}},
publisher = {{Taylor & Francis}},
series = {{West European Politics}},
title = {{Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713601584}},
doi = {{10.1080/713601584}},
volume = {{25}},
year = {{2002}},
}