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Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability

Tallberg, Jonas LU (2000) In Journal of European Public Policy 7(1). p.104-121
Abstract
Existing research on supranational autonomy in the European Union (EU) is predominantly concerned with political and judicial agenda-setting, whereas the supranational institutions' capacity to exert independent influence in post-decisional enforcement has received more limited attention. Employing principal-agent analysis, this article explores an important component of the supranational institutions' efforts to boost EU enforcement during the last decade - the European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) establishment of the principle of state liability in conflict with the explicit wishes of national governments. This case suggests that the supranational institutions may exercise independent influence not only through agenda-setting, but also by... (More)
Existing research on supranational autonomy in the European Union (EU) is predominantly concerned with political and judicial agenda-setting, whereas the supranational institutions' capacity to exert independent influence in post-decisional enforcement has received more limited attention. Employing principal-agent analysis, this article explores an important component of the supranational institutions' efforts to boost EU enforcement during the last decade - the European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) establishment of the principle of state liability in conflict with the explicit wishes of national governments. This case suggests that the supranational institutions may exercise independent influence not only through agenda-setting, but also by moving the enforcement of state compliance beyond governments' original intentions when delegating supervisory competences. Tracing the attempts of member states to undo or limit the effects of the ECJ's actions, the article confirms the limits of treaty revision as a sanction, but suggests that state inaction at the national level constitutes a form of sanction which should not be neglected. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Politik i Europa
in
Journal of European Public Policy
volume
7
issue
1
pages
104 - 121
publisher
Taylor & Francis
external identifiers
  • scopus:0034387190
ISSN
1350-1763
DOI
10.1080/135017600343296
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
e84e4242-a930-4f48-9d23-648d505ef027 (old id 144117)
date added to LUP
2007-06-25 16:21:18
date last changed
2017-07-30 03:48:45
@article{e84e4242-a930-4f48-9d23-648d505ef027,
  abstract     = {Existing research on supranational autonomy in the European Union (EU) is predominantly concerned with political and judicial agenda-setting, whereas the supranational institutions' capacity to exert independent influence in post-decisional enforcement has received more limited attention. Employing principal-agent analysis, this article explores an important component of the supranational institutions' efforts to boost EU enforcement during the last decade - the European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) establishment of the principle of state liability in conflict with the explicit wishes of national governments. This case suggests that the supranational institutions may exercise independent influence not only through agenda-setting, but also by moving the enforcement of state compliance beyond governments' original intentions when delegating supervisory competences. Tracing the attempts of member states to undo or limit the effects of the ECJ's actions, the article confirms the limits of treaty revision as a sanction, but suggests that state inaction at the national level constitutes a form of sanction which should not be neglected.},
  author       = {Tallberg, Jonas},
  issn         = {1350-1763},
  keyword      = {Politik i Europa},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {104--121},
  publisher    = {Taylor & Francis},
  series       = {Journal of European Public Policy},
  title        = {Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/135017600343296},
  volume       = {7},
  year         = {2000},
}