Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
(2009) In Economic Theory 40(2). p.227-245- Abstract
- This paper considers the problem of assigning a finite number of indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., to the same number of individuals. There is also a divisible good (money) and the individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of individuals can improve the allocation for all of its members, by misrepresenting their preferences, is characterized. It turns out that given a regularity condition, the outcome of a fair and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule must maximize the use of money subject to upper quantity bounds determined by the allocation rule. If available money is nonnegative, objects may be jobs and... (More)
- This paper considers the problem of assigning a finite number of indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., to the same number of individuals. There is also a divisible good (money) and the individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of individuals can improve the allocation for all of its members, by misrepresenting their preferences, is characterized. It turns out that given a regularity condition, the outcome of a fair and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule must maximize the use of money subject to upper quantity bounds determined by the allocation rule. If available money is nonnegative, objects may be jobs and the distribution of money a wage structure. If available money is negative, the formal model may reflect a multi-object auction. In both cases fairness means equilibrium, i.e., that each individual receives a most demanded object. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1443966
- author
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2009
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Multi-object auction, Wages, Coalitional strategy-proofness, Indivisibilities, Fairness
- in
- Economic Theory
- volume
- 40
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 227 - 245
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000266655300004
- scopus:67349131629
- ISSN
- 1432-0479
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00199-008-0366-4
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 635d1647-e11a-4adb-af70-210d467abc57 (old id 1443966)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 11:38:06
- date last changed
- 2022-03-20 08:38:47
@article{635d1647-e11a-4adb-af70-210d467abc57,
abstract = {{This paper considers the problem of assigning a finite number of indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., to the same number of individuals. There is also a divisible good (money) and the individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of individuals can improve the allocation for all of its members, by misrepresenting their preferences, is characterized. It turns out that given a regularity condition, the outcome of a fair and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule must maximize the use of money subject to upper quantity bounds determined by the allocation rule. If available money is nonnegative, objects may be jobs and the distribution of money a wage structure. If available money is negative, the formal model may reflect a multi-object auction. In both cases fairness means equilibrium, i.e., that each individual receives a most demanded object.}},
author = {{Svensson, Lars-Gunnar}},
issn = {{1432-0479}},
keywords = {{Multi-object auction; Wages; Coalitional strategy-proofness; Indivisibilities; Fairness}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{227--245}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Economic Theory}},
title = {{Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0366-4}},
doi = {{10.1007/s00199-008-0366-4}},
volume = {{40}},
year = {{2009}},
}