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A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited

Andersson, Tommy LU (2009) In Economics Bulletin 29(3). p.1719-1724
Abstract
This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
assignment game, fairness, strategy-proofness
in
Economics Bulletin
volume
29
issue
3
pages
1719 - 1724
publisher
Economics Bulletin
external identifiers
  • Scopus:77952897844
ISSN
1545-2921
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
ccd6f2ea-d82b-4a2a-8333-973dbc81b3bc (old id 1451850)
alternative location
http://www.economicsbulletin.com/
date added to LUP
2009-08-04 09:27:00
date last changed
2017-01-01 07:45:24
@article{ccd6f2ea-d82b-4a2a-8333-973dbc81b3bc,
  abstract     = {This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.},
  author       = {Andersson, Tommy},
  issn         = {1545-2921},
  keyword      = {assignment game,fairness,strategy-proofness},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {1719--1724},
  publisher    = {Economics Bulletin},
  series       = {Economics Bulletin},
  title        = {A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited},
  volume       = {29},
  year         = {2009},
}