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Goodness, Values, Reasons

Brännmark, Johan LU (2009) In Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12(4). p.329-343
Abstract
Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like "good" or "valuable", the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern of analysis for conceptualizing evaluative properties. Instead, a better alternative can be found in a metaphysical version of the Geachean view that goodness is always attributive and never predicative,... (More)
Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like "good" or "valuable", the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern of analysis for conceptualizing evaluative properties. Instead, a better alternative can be found in a metaphysical version of the Geachean view that goodness is always attributive and never predicative, namely that goodness is always a matter of relative placement in certain kinds of comparison classes. It is then suggested that the good and the valuable need to be separated from each other and that the latter is a species of the former. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Buck-passing, Analysis, Goodness, Value, Attributive
in
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
volume
12
issue
4
pages
329 - 343
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • wos:000270838600002
  • scopus:70350029339
ISSN
1386-2820
DOI
10.1007/s10677-009-9175-5
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
78a8676d-c95d-4e97-828d-386fff9dc42a (old id 1506961)
date added to LUP
2009-11-23 13:03:13
date last changed
2017-01-01 05:08:52
@article{78a8676d-c95d-4e97-828d-386fff9dc42a,
  abstract     = {Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like "good" or "valuable", the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern of analysis for conceptualizing evaluative properties. Instead, a better alternative can be found in a metaphysical version of the Geachean view that goodness is always attributive and never predicative, namely that goodness is always a matter of relative placement in certain kinds of comparison classes. It is then suggested that the good and the valuable need to be separated from each other and that the latter is a species of the former.},
  author       = {Brännmark, Johan},
  issn         = {1386-2820},
  keyword      = {Buck-passing,Analysis,Goodness,Value,Attributive},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {329--343},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
  title        = {Goodness, Values, Reasons},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9175-5},
  volume       = {12},
  year         = {2009},
}