Ethical Theories and the Transparency Condition
(2009) In Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12(5). p.449-462- Abstract
- Following John Rawls, writers like Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard have suggested that a transparency condition should be put on ethical theories. The exact nature of such a condition and its implications is however not anything on which there is any consensus. It is argued here that the ultimate rationale of transparency conditions is epistemic rather than substantively moral, but also that it clearly connects to substantive concerns about moral psychology. Finally, it is argued that once a satisfactory form of the transparency condition is formulated, then, at least among the main contenders within ethical theory, it speaks in favor of a broadly Aristotelian approach to ethical theorizing.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1519496
- author
- Brännmark, Johan LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2009
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Transparency, Practicality, Moral psychology, Ethics, Methodology
- in
- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- volume
- 12
- issue
- 5
- pages
- 449 - 462
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000271749100002
- scopus:76149085858
- ISSN
- 1386-2820
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10677-009-9160-z
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- f9615f97-0422-49a7-9dd3-7567f3b1437c (old id 1519496)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 12:27:33
- date last changed
- 2022-01-27 05:21:05
@article{f9615f97-0422-49a7-9dd3-7567f3b1437c, abstract = {{Following John Rawls, writers like Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard have suggested that a transparency condition should be put on ethical theories. The exact nature of such a condition and its implications is however not anything on which there is any consensus. It is argued here that the ultimate rationale of transparency conditions is epistemic rather than substantively moral, but also that it clearly connects to substantive concerns about moral psychology. Finally, it is argued that once a satisfactory form of the transparency condition is formulated, then, at least among the main contenders within ethical theory, it speaks in favor of a broadly Aristotelian approach to ethical theorizing.}}, author = {{Brännmark, Johan}}, issn = {{1386-2820}}, keywords = {{Transparency; Practicality; Moral psychology; Ethics; Methodology}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{449--462}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, series = {{Ethical Theory and Moral Practice}}, title = {{Ethical Theories and the Transparency Condition}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9160-z}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10677-009-9160-z}}, volume = {{12}}, year = {{2009}}, }