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Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?

Tallberg, Jonas LU (2002) In West European Politics 25(1). p.23-46
Abstract
Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, the article argues that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating... (More)
Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, the article argues that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating or obstructing attempts by the institutions to implement private agendas; and (4) the consequences of previous rounds of delegation affect future delegation, institutional design, and interaction, through positive and negative feed-back loops. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Internationell politik, Politik i Europa
in
West European Politics
volume
25
issue
1
pages
23 - 46
publisher
Taylor & Francis
external identifiers
  • scopus:0036168697
ISSN
0140-2382
DOI
10.1080/713601584
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
13c67bdf-8ab8-41c1-be1a-40b1f0bdb4dc (old id 156367)
date added to LUP
2007-06-25 16:23:20
date last changed
2017-11-19 04:12:22
@article{13c67bdf-8ab8-41c1-be1a-40b1f0bdb4dc,
  abstract     = {Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, the article argues that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating or obstructing attempts by the institutions to implement private agendas; and (4) the consequences of previous rounds of delegation affect future delegation, institutional design, and interaction, through positive and negative feed-back loops.},
  author       = {Tallberg, Jonas},
  issn         = {0140-2382},
  keyword      = {Internationell politik,Politik i Europa},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {23--46},
  publisher    = {Taylor & Francis},
  series       = {West European Politics},
  title        = {Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713601584},
  volume       = {25},
  year         = {2002},
}