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The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency, and Distribution in EU Negotiations

Tallberg, Jonas LU (2003) In Journal of Common Market Studies 42(5). p.999-1022
Abstract
Decision-making in the European Union is subject to the risk of negotiation failure, because of governments' incentives to conceal their true preferences. This article argues that the EU Presidency possesses a set of informational and procedural resources that can help unlock incompatible negotiating positions and secure efficient agreements, while simultaneously allowing the government in office to shape distributional outcomes. Drawing on general bargaining theory and rational choice institutionalism, it presents a theory of the demand for, and supply of, brokerage by the chair. The explanatory power of this theory is demonstrated through two case studies: Germany's chairing of the negotiations, and France's chairing of the IGC 2000... (More)
Decision-making in the European Union is subject to the risk of negotiation failure, because of governments' incentives to conceal their true preferences. This article argues that the EU Presidency possesses a set of informational and procedural resources that can help unlock incompatible negotiating positions and secure efficient agreements, while simultaneously allowing the government in office to shape distributional outcomes. Drawing on general bargaining theory and rational choice institutionalism, it presents a theory of the demand for, and supply of, brokerage by the chair. The explanatory power of this theory is demonstrated through two case studies: Germany's chairing of the negotiations, and France's chairing of the IGC 2000 negotiations. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Förhandlingar, Politik i Europa
in
Journal of Common Market Studies
volume
42
issue
5
pages
999 - 1022
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN
0021-9886
DOI
10.1111/j.0021-9886.2004.00538.x
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
ac61c3c9-6b18-4929-a590-45b2bbf6e40b (old id 156376)
date added to LUP
2007-06-25 16:30:47
date last changed
2016-04-15 18:42:01
@article{ac61c3c9-6b18-4929-a590-45b2bbf6e40b,
  abstract     = {Decision-making in the European Union is subject to the risk of negotiation failure, because of governments' incentives to conceal their true preferences. This article argues that the EU Presidency possesses a set of informational and procedural resources that can help unlock incompatible negotiating positions and secure efficient agreements, while simultaneously allowing the government in office to shape distributional outcomes. Drawing on general bargaining theory and rational choice institutionalism, it presents a theory of the demand for, and supply of, brokerage by the chair. The explanatory power of this theory is demonstrated through two case studies: Germany's chairing of the negotiations, and France's chairing of the IGC 2000 negotiations.},
  author       = {Tallberg, Jonas},
  issn         = {0021-9886},
  keyword      = {Förhandlingar,Politik i Europa},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {5},
  pages        = {999--1022},
  publisher    = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  series       = {Journal of Common Market Studies},
  title        = {The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency, and Distribution in EU Negotiations},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-9886.2004.00538.x},
  volume       = {42},
  year         = {2003},
}