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Ethical theory and the philosophy of risk: first thoughts

Brännmark, Johan LU and Sahlin, Nils-Eric LU (2010) In Journal of Risk Research 13(2). p.149-161
Abstract
Contemporary psychological research has shown that if we are judged by the standards of classical models of rationality our decision-making abilities can be seriously questioned. We are more or less irrational. The article investigates how this 'fact of irrationality' affects the way normative ethical theories should be formulated and the extent to which currently dominant ethical theories can be taken seriously as normative ideals of actual human decision-making. It is argued that these theories tend to presuppose a too unified and rationalistic account of human agency and that there is reason to turn attention instead to a level of ethical theorizing that lies between traditional ethical theory and applied ethics. It is also argued that... (More)
Contemporary psychological research has shown that if we are judged by the standards of classical models of rationality our decision-making abilities can be seriously questioned. We are more or less irrational. The article investigates how this 'fact of irrationality' affects the way normative ethical theories should be formulated and the extent to which currently dominant ethical theories can be taken seriously as normative ideals of actual human decision-making. It is argued that these theories tend to presuppose a too unified and rationalistic account of human agency and that there is reason to turn attention instead to a level of ethical theorizing that lies between traditional ethical theory and applied ethics. It is also argued that given such an approach, matters of risk and uncertainty should be more directly integrated into basic ethical theorizing than what is traditionally the case. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
uncertainty, risk, decision-making, irrationality, ethics, middle theory
in
Journal of Risk Research
volume
13
issue
2
pages
149 - 161
publisher
Routledge
external identifiers
  • wos:000274554400003
  • scopus:77049111573
ISSN
1366-9877
DOI
10.1080/13669870903126192
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
902ab5bf-4c44-429b-bed7-68ebd60ef0cc (old id 1568884)
date added to LUP
2010-03-17 10:38:52
date last changed
2018-05-29 09:49:51
@article{902ab5bf-4c44-429b-bed7-68ebd60ef0cc,
  abstract     = {Contemporary psychological research has shown that if we are judged by the standards of classical models of rationality our decision-making abilities can be seriously questioned. We are more or less irrational. The article investigates how this 'fact of irrationality' affects the way normative ethical theories should be formulated and the extent to which currently dominant ethical theories can be taken seriously as normative ideals of actual human decision-making. It is argued that these theories tend to presuppose a too unified and rationalistic account of human agency and that there is reason to turn attention instead to a level of ethical theorizing that lies between traditional ethical theory and applied ethics. It is also argued that given such an approach, matters of risk and uncertainty should be more directly integrated into basic ethical theorizing than what is traditionally the case.},
  author       = {Brännmark, Johan and Sahlin, Nils-Eric},
  issn         = {1366-9877},
  keyword      = {uncertainty,risk,decision-making,irrationality,ethics,middle theory},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {149--161},
  publisher    = {Routledge},
  series       = {Journal of Risk Research},
  title        = {Ethical theory and the philosophy of risk: first thoughts},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13669870903126192},
  volume       = {13},
  year         = {2010},
}