Bidding rings : a bargaining approach
(2017) In Games and Economic Behavior- Abstract
- We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We analyze this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves. In the single unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition structure can only be an order preserving r-ring , that includes the winner and the top (r−1)(r−1) losers. In the multiple units case, we specify sufficient conditions for formation of an interesting class of equilibrium coalition structures, which we call single winner ring with free riding, where exactly one winner colludes with all the losers and generates maximum possible bidders' surplus, and, depending on the protocol, the remaining winners free... (More)
- We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We analyze this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves. In the single unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition structure can only be an order preserving r-ring , that includes the winner and the top (r−1)(r−1) losers. In the multiple units case, we specify sufficient conditions for formation of an interesting class of equilibrium coalition structures, which we call single winner ring with free riding, where exactly one winner colludes with all the losers and generates maximum possible bidders' surplus, and, depending on the protocol, the remaining winners free ride either by staying alone or by colluding in pairs. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/17f55d99-ab5d-4834-9329-fe0a77239ca1
- author
- Chatterjee, Kalyan ; Mitra, Manipushpak and Mukherjee, Conan LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2017-05
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Bidding rings, Bargaining games, Coalition formation, Auctions, C71, C72, C78, D44, L41
- in
- Games and Economic Behavior
- pages
- 16 pages
- publisher
- 0899-8256
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84964329562
- wos:000404821700005
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.007
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 17f55d99-ab5d-4834-9329-fe0a77239ca1
- date added to LUP
- 2016-07-25 13:44:47
- date last changed
- 2022-07-12 10:24:38
@article{17f55d99-ab5d-4834-9329-fe0a77239ca1,
abstract = {{We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We analyze this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves. In the single unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition structure can only be an order preserving r-ring , that includes the winner and the top (r−1)(r−1) losers. In the multiple units case, we specify sufficient conditions for formation of an interesting class of equilibrium coalition structures, which we call single winner ring with free riding, where exactly one winner colludes with all the losers and generates maximum possible bidders' surplus, and, depending on the protocol, the remaining winners free ride either by staying alone or by colluding in pairs.}},
author = {{Chatterjee, Kalyan and Mitra, Manipushpak and Mukherjee, Conan}},
issn = {{0899-8256}},
keywords = {{Bidding rings; Bargaining games; Coalition formation; Auctions; C71; C72; C78; D44; L41}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{0899-8256}},
series = {{Games and Economic Behavior}},
title = {{Bidding rings : a bargaining approach}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.007}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.007}},
year = {{2017}},
}