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Cabinets, Prime Ministers and Corruption. A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Governments in Post-War Europe

Bäck, Hanna LU ; Teorell, Jan LU and Lindberg, Staffan I LU (2016) In STANCE Working Paper Series 2016(6).
Abstract
Why are some states more corrupt than others? Previous research explaining corruption suggests that multiparty governments are associated with higher levels of corruption since it is difficult for voters to hold parties in such cabinets accountable. Drawing on the literature on coalition governance, we suggest that a lack of government corruption has more to do with the ability of other key political actors to control the agents that have been delegated power in cabinet. We use a new dataset (Varieties of Democracy), giving us more specific measures on governmental corruption across a longer time-period. We show that corruption is significantly lower when the Prime Minister (PM) has strong constitutional powers, suggesting that the PM as a... (More)
Why are some states more corrupt than others? Previous research explaining corruption suggests that multiparty governments are associated with higher levels of corruption since it is difficult for voters to hold parties in such cabinets accountable. Drawing on the literature on coalition governance, we suggest that a lack of government corruption has more to do with the ability of other key political actors to control the agents that have been delegated power in cabinet. We use a new dataset (Varieties of Democracy), giving us more specific measures on governmental corruption across a longer time-period. We show that corruption is significantly lower when the Prime Minister (PM) has strong constitutional powers, suggesting that the PM as a principal reduces agency problems. (Less)
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author
; and
organization
publishing date
type
Working paper
publication status
published
subject
keywords
corruption, multiparty government, accountability, coalition governance, Varieties of Democracy, V-dem dataset, constitutional power, prime ministers
in
STANCE Working Paper Series
volume
2016
issue
6
pages
35 pages
publisher
Department of Political Science, Lund University
project
State-Making and the Origins of Global Order in the Long Nineteenth Century and Beyond
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
19b2b43f-5d10-41cb-b4b8-958c38c9e364
date added to LUP
2016-06-07 16:17:38
date last changed
2018-11-21 21:24:08
@misc{19b2b43f-5d10-41cb-b4b8-958c38c9e364,
  abstract     = {Why are some states more corrupt than others? Previous research explaining corruption suggests that multiparty governments are associated with higher levels of corruption since it is difficult for voters to hold parties in such cabinets accountable. Drawing on the literature on coalition governance, we suggest that a lack of government corruption has more to do with the ability of other key political actors to control the agents that have been delegated power in cabinet. We use a new dataset (Varieties of Democracy), giving us more specific measures on governmental corruption across a longer time-period. We show that corruption is significantly lower when the Prime Minister (PM) has strong constitutional powers, suggesting that the PM as a principal reduces agency problems.},
  author       = {Bäck, Hanna and Teorell, Jan and Lindberg, Staffan I},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Working Paper},
  number       = {6},
  publisher    = {Department of Political Science, Lund University},
  series       = {STANCE Working Paper Series},
  title        = {Cabinets, Prime Ministers and Corruption. A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Governments in Post-War Europe},
  url          = {https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/ws/files/10948581/2016_6_Ba_ck_Teorell_Lindberg.pdf},
  volume       = {2016},
  year         = {2016},
}