Strategy revision opportunities and collusion
(2019) In Experimental Economics 22(4). p.834-856- Abstract
This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1e151af5-9435-47ac-af50-06b701b47a35
- author
- Embrey, Matthew ; Mengel, Friederike LU and Peeters, Ronald
- organization
- publishing date
- 2019-12
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Complements versus substitutes, Cooperation, Repeated games, Strategy revision opportunities
- in
- Experimental Economics
- volume
- 22
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 23 pages
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85049586187
- ISSN
- 1386-4157
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10683-018-9580-5
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 1e151af5-9435-47ac-af50-06b701b47a35
- date added to LUP
- 2018-07-23 09:48:30
- date last changed
- 2022-04-17 21:31:38
@article{1e151af5-9435-47ac-af50-06b701b47a35, abstract = {{<p>This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.</p>}}, author = {{Embrey, Matthew and Mengel, Friederike and Peeters, Ronald}}, issn = {{1386-4157}}, keywords = {{Complements versus substitutes; Cooperation; Repeated games; Strategy revision opportunities}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{834--856}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, series = {{Experimental Economics}}, title = {{Strategy revision opportunities and collusion}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9580-5}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10683-018-9580-5}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2019}}, }