Skip to main content

Lund University Publications

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Strategy revision opportunities and collusion

Embrey, Matthew ; Mengel, Friederike LU and Peeters, Ronald (2019) In Experimental Economics 22(4). p.834-856
Abstract

This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
; and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Complements versus substitutes, Cooperation, Repeated games, Strategy revision opportunities
in
Experimental Economics
volume
22
issue
4
pages
23 pages
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:85049586187
ISSN
1386-4157
DOI
10.1007/s10683-018-9580-5
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
1e151af5-9435-47ac-af50-06b701b47a35
date added to LUP
2018-07-23 09:48:30
date last changed
2022-04-17 21:31:38
@article{1e151af5-9435-47ac-af50-06b701b47a35,
  abstract     = {{<p>This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.</p>}},
  author       = {{Embrey, Matthew and Mengel, Friederike and Peeters, Ronald}},
  issn         = {{1386-4157}},
  keywords     = {{Complements versus substitutes; Cooperation; Repeated games; Strategy revision opportunities}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{834--856}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  series       = {{Experimental Economics}},
  title        = {{Strategy revision opportunities and collusion}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9580-5}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10683-018-9580-5}},
  volume       = {{22}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}