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Evolutionary Games and Matching Rules

Jensen , Martin Kaae and Rigos, Alexandros LU (2018) In International Journal of Game Theory
Abstract
This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n ≥ 2 individuals using pure strategies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the matching process. For arbitrary matching processes (called matching rules), we study Nash equilibrium and ESS in the associated population game and show that several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive... (More)
This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n ≥ 2 individuals using pure strategies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the matching process. For arbitrary matching processes (called matching rules), we study Nash equilibrium and ESS in the associated population game and show that several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to average fitness maximization. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
epub
subject
keywords
Evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), non-uniformly random matching, assortative matching, Replicator dynamic
in
International Journal of Game Theory
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:85048357460
ISSN
1432-1270
DOI
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
2be72259-566b-4a50-9516-2dd06aa19087
date added to LUP
2018-06-12 10:41:17
date last changed
2018-06-25 15:58:41
@article{2be72259-566b-4a50-9516-2dd06aa19087,
  abstract     = {This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n ≥ 2 individuals using pure strategies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the matching process. For arbitrary matching processes (called matching rules), we study Nash equilibrium and ESS in the associated population game and show that several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to average fitness maximization. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games.},
  author       = {Jensen , Martin Kaae and Rigos, Alexandros},
  issn         = {1432-1270},
  keyword      = {Evolutionary game theory,evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS),non-uniformly random matching,assortative matching,Replicator dynamic},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {06},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  title        = {Evolutionary Games and Matching Rules},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/},
  year         = {2018},
}