Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size
(2007) In Journal of Theoretical Biology 246(4). p.720-724- Abstract
- I formulate a simple model of the ultimatum game, in which a proposer and a responder can receive a reward if they agree on how to divide this reward between them. The model is easy to analyse and shows that strong tendencies to fair division are expected when evolution of strategy frequencies follow the traditional gradient dynamics assumed in evolutionary models. The mean stable offer is typically around 20-40% although this depends on the maximum payoff and if rejection thresholds can evolve independently from proposals. The stable proportion offered at evolutionary equilibrium increases with the maximum payoff, if proposal and acceptance thresholds are dictated by the same strategy and cannot evolve independently. If proposal and... (More)
- I formulate a simple model of the ultimatum game, in which a proposer and a responder can receive a reward if they agree on how to divide this reward between them. The model is easy to analyse and shows that strong tendencies to fair division are expected when evolution of strategy frequencies follow the traditional gradient dynamics assumed in evolutionary models. The mean stable offer is typically around 20-40% although this depends on the maximum payoff and if rejection thresholds can evolve independently from proposals. The stable proportion offered at evolutionary equilibrium increases with the maximum payoff, if proposal and acceptance thresholds are dictated by the same strategy and cannot evolve independently. If proposal and acceptance evolve independently, the stable proportion instead decreases with the maximum payoff. The stable outcome may also show substantial variation. (C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1416857
- author
- Härdling, Roger LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2007
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- cooperation, ultimatum game, game theory, fairness, evolution, COOPERATION, ALTRUISM, INDIRECT RECIPROCITY
- in
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
- volume
- 246
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 720 - 724
- publisher
- Academic Press
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000247097000010
- scopus:34248152790
- pmid:17350654
- ISSN
- 1095-8541
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.01.026
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- additional info
- The information about affiliations in this record was updated in December 2015. The record was previously connected to the following departments: Animal Ecology (Closed 2011) (011012001)
- id
- 37f34fe6-e951-469f-967a-3d81a8a672ce (old id 1416857)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 15:51:57
- date last changed
- 2022-03-22 06:44:10
@article{37f34fe6-e951-469f-967a-3d81a8a672ce,
abstract = {{I formulate a simple model of the ultimatum game, in which a proposer and a responder can receive a reward if they agree on how to divide this reward between them. The model is easy to analyse and shows that strong tendencies to fair division are expected when evolution of strategy frequencies follow the traditional gradient dynamics assumed in evolutionary models. The mean stable offer is typically around 20-40% although this depends on the maximum payoff and if rejection thresholds can evolve independently from proposals. The stable proportion offered at evolutionary equilibrium increases with the maximum payoff, if proposal and acceptance thresholds are dictated by the same strategy and cannot evolve independently. If proposal and acceptance evolve independently, the stable proportion instead decreases with the maximum payoff. The stable outcome may also show substantial variation. (C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.}},
author = {{Härdling, Roger}},
issn = {{1095-8541}},
keywords = {{cooperation; ultimatum game; game theory; fairness; evolution; COOPERATION; ALTRUISM; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{4}},
pages = {{720--724}},
publisher = {{Academic Press}},
series = {{Journal of Theoretical Biology}},
title = {{Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.01.026}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.01.026}},
volume = {{246}},
year = {{2007}},
}