Advanced

Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size

Härdling, Roger LU (2007) In Journal of Theoretical Biology 246(4). p.720-724
Abstract
I formulate a simple model of the ultimatum game, in which a proposer and a responder can receive a reward if they agree on how to divide this reward between them. The model is easy to analyse and shows that strong tendencies to fair division are expected when evolution of strategy frequencies follow the traditional gradient dynamics assumed in evolutionary models. The mean stable offer is typically around 20-40% although this depends on the maximum payoff and if rejection thresholds can evolve independently from proposals. The stable proportion offered at evolutionary equilibrium increases with the maximum payoff, if proposal and acceptance thresholds are dictated by the same strategy and cannot evolve independently. If proposal and... (More)
I formulate a simple model of the ultimatum game, in which a proposer and a responder can receive a reward if they agree on how to divide this reward between them. The model is easy to analyse and shows that strong tendencies to fair division are expected when evolution of strategy frequencies follow the traditional gradient dynamics assumed in evolutionary models. The mean stable offer is typically around 20-40% although this depends on the maximum payoff and if rejection thresholds can evolve independently from proposals. The stable proportion offered at evolutionary equilibrium increases with the maximum payoff, if proposal and acceptance thresholds are dictated by the same strategy and cannot evolve independently. If proposal and acceptance evolve independently, the stable proportion instead decreases with the maximum payoff. The stable outcome may also show substantial variation. (C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
cooperation, ultimatum game, game theory, fairness, evolution, COOPERATION, ALTRUISM, INDIRECT RECIPROCITY
in
Journal of Theoretical Biology
volume
246
issue
4
pages
720 - 724
publisher
Academic Press
external identifiers
  • wos:000247097000010
  • scopus:34248152790
  • pmid:17350654
ISSN
1095-8541
DOI
10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.01.026
language
English
LU publication?
yes
additional info
The information about affiliations in this record was updated in December 2015. The record was previously connected to the following departments: Animal Ecology (Closed 2011) (011012001)
id
37f34fe6-e951-469f-967a-3d81a8a672ce (old id 1416857)
date added to LUP
2016-04-01 15:51:57
date last changed
2020-01-29 05:47:51
@article{37f34fe6-e951-469f-967a-3d81a8a672ce,
  abstract     = {I formulate a simple model of the ultimatum game, in which a proposer and a responder can receive a reward if they agree on how to divide this reward between them. The model is easy to analyse and shows that strong tendencies to fair division are expected when evolution of strategy frequencies follow the traditional gradient dynamics assumed in evolutionary models. The mean stable offer is typically around 20-40% although this depends on the maximum payoff and if rejection thresholds can evolve independently from proposals. The stable proportion offered at evolutionary equilibrium increases with the maximum payoff, if proposal and acceptance thresholds are dictated by the same strategy and cannot evolve independently. If proposal and acceptance evolve independently, the stable proportion instead decreases with the maximum payoff. The stable outcome may also show substantial variation. (C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.},
  author       = {Härdling, Roger},
  issn         = {1095-8541},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {720--724},
  publisher    = {Academic Press},
  series       = {Journal of Theoretical Biology},
  title        = {Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.01.026},
  doi          = {10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.01.026},
  volume       = {246},
  year         = {2007},
}