Formal Models of Assertion
(2019)- Abstract
- This article provides an overview of different formal models that could be of interest to epistemologists interested in assertion. It also says something about where they fit into the general picture of assertion as a phenomenon involving both an asserter and an assertee. The author’s perspective is that of the philosopher rather than that of the logician. A semiformal level of description is employed, partly because some models are highly complex and merely introducing the basic formal machinery, let alone some elementary results or proofs, would consume too much space. The term “formal” is used in a broad sense to include theories that have mathematical or logical elements, even if they are not completely formal. The discussions cover... (More)
- This article provides an overview of different formal models that could be of interest to epistemologists interested in assertion. It also says something about where they fit into the general picture of assertion as a phenomenon involving both an asserter and an assertee. The author’s perspective is that of the philosopher rather than that of the logician. A semiformal level of description is employed, partly because some models are highly complex and merely introducing the basic formal machinery, let alone some elementary results or proofs, would consume too much space. The term “formal” is used in a broad sense to include theories that have mathematical or logical elements, even if they are not completely formal. The discussions cover Bayesian models of assertion and logical models. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/440b1b54-2e9b-425f-af72-c38c62691dbe
- author
- Olsson, Erik J LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2019-06
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- assertion, formal models, epistemiologists, Bayesian model, logical model
- host publication
- The Oxford Handbook of Assertion
- editor
- Goldberg, Sanford
- pages
- 23 pages
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- ISBN
- 9780190675233
- DOI
- 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.43
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 440b1b54-2e9b-425f-af72-c38c62691dbe
- date added to LUP
- 2018-01-31 12:20:24
- date last changed
- 2020-06-28 04:00:52
@inbook{440b1b54-2e9b-425f-af72-c38c62691dbe, abstract = {{This article provides an overview of different formal models that could be of interest to epistemologists interested in assertion. It also says something about where they fit into the general picture of assertion as a phenomenon involving both an asserter and an assertee. The author’s perspective is that of the philosopher rather than that of the logician. A semiformal level of description is employed, partly because some models are highly complex and merely introducing the basic formal machinery, let alone some elementary results or proofs, would consume too much space. The term “formal” is used in a broad sense to include theories that have mathematical or logical elements, even if they are not completely formal. The discussions cover Bayesian models of assertion and logical models.}}, author = {{Olsson, Erik J}}, booktitle = {{The Oxford Handbook of Assertion}}, editor = {{Goldberg, Sanford}}, isbn = {{9780190675233}}, keywords = {{assertion; formal models; epistemiologists; Bayesian model; logical model}}, language = {{eng}}, publisher = {{Oxford University Press}}, title = {{Formal Models of Assertion}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.43}}, doi = {{10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.43}}, year = {{2019}}, }