On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance
(2014) In Synthese 191(11). p.2445-2470- Abstract
- Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most... (More)
- Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most adequately captures the examples cited as paradigmatic cases of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. In doing so, we will stress certain key epistemic and social interactive aspects of the phenomenon. Second, given our characterization of pluralistic ignorance, we argue that the phenomenon can indeed arise in groups of perfectly rational agents. This, in turn, ensures that the tools of formal epistemology can be fully utilized to reason about pluralistic ignorance. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/4456872
- author
- Bjerring, Jens Christian ; Hansen, Jens Ulrik LU and Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding
- organization
- publishing date
- 2014
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Pluralistic ignorance Epistemic rationality Social behavior Rational interaction Private beliefs Public beliefs
- in
- Synthese
- volume
- 191
- issue
- 11
- pages
- 2445 - 2470
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000337053600006
- scopus:84896429021
- ISSN
- 0039-7857
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11229-014-0434-1
- project
- Collective Competence in Deliberative Groups: On the Epistemological Foundation of Democracy
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 0c1457e5-a73c-47d7-bb1e-d4017f4519a9 (old id 4456872)
- alternative location
- http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-014-0434-1
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 14:26:52
- date last changed
- 2022-03-22 00:07:16
@article{0c1457e5-a73c-47d7-bb1e-d4017f4519a9,
abstract = {{Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most adequately captures the examples cited as paradigmatic cases of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. In doing so, we will stress certain key epistemic and social interactive aspects of the phenomenon. Second, given our characterization of pluralistic ignorance, we argue that the phenomenon can indeed arise in groups of perfectly rational agents. This, in turn, ensures that the tools of formal epistemology can be fully utilized to reason about pluralistic ignorance.}},
author = {{Bjerring, Jens Christian and Hansen, Jens Ulrik and Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding}},
issn = {{0039-7857}},
keywords = {{Pluralistic ignorance Epistemic rationality Social behavior Rational interaction Private beliefs Public beliefs}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{11}},
pages = {{2445--2470}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Synthese}},
title = {{On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0434-1}},
doi = {{10.1007/s11229-014-0434-1}},
volume = {{191}},
year = {{2014}},
}