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When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review

Gudmundsson, Jens LU (2014) In Review of Economic Design 18(2). p.151-161
Abstract
We compare different preference restrictions that ensure the existence of a stable roommate matching. Some of these restrictions are generalized to allow for indifferences as well as incomplete preference lists, in the sense that an agent may prefer remaining single to matching with some agents. We also introduce a new type of cycles and in greater detail investigate the domain of preferences that have no such cycles. In particular, we show how the absence of these cycles relates to the "symmetric utilities hypothesis" by Rodrigues-Neto (J Econ Theory 135:545-550, 2007) when applied to roommate problems with weak preferences.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Roommate problem, Existence, Stable matching, Cycles
in
Review of Economic Design
volume
18
issue
2
pages
151 - 161
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • wos:000336405600004
  • scopus:84901247400
ISSN
1434-4742
DOI
10.1007/s10058-013-0150-1
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
02f915f6-dc4a-4c5d-a895-fcbc2ef57d60 (old id 4559025)
date added to LUP
2014-07-17 13:58:54
date last changed
2017-05-28 04:01:02
@article{02f915f6-dc4a-4c5d-a895-fcbc2ef57d60,
  abstract     = {We compare different preference restrictions that ensure the existence of a stable roommate matching. Some of these restrictions are generalized to allow for indifferences as well as incomplete preference lists, in the sense that an agent may prefer remaining single to matching with some agents. We also introduce a new type of cycles and in greater detail investigate the domain of preferences that have no such cycles. In particular, we show how the absence of these cycles relates to the "symmetric utilities hypothesis" by Rodrigues-Neto (J Econ Theory 135:545-550, 2007) when applied to roommate problems with weak preferences.},
  author       = {Gudmundsson, Jens},
  issn         = {1434-4742},
  keyword      = {Roommate problem,Existence,Stable matching,Cycles},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {151--161},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Review of Economic Design},
  title        = {When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0150-1},
  volume       = {18},
  year         = {2014},
}