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Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies

Bernergård, Axel and Mohlin, Erik LU (2019) In Games and Economic Behavior 117. p.82-97
Abstract
This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and first-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies.
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author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, Iterated admissibility, Payoff monotonicity, Convex monotonicity, Evolutionary dynamics, Replicator dynamic, C72, C73
in
Games and Economic Behavior
volume
117
pages
82 - 97
publisher
Academic Press
external identifiers
  • scopus:85068076580
ISSN
0899-8256
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.009
language
Swedish
LU publication?
yes
id
45786328-e22a-4e0a-bf33-76983055a52e
date added to LUP
2019-06-26 15:38:18
date last changed
2025-10-14 10:35:15
@article{45786328-e22a-4e0a-bf33-76983055a52e,
  abstract     = {{This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and first-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies.}},
  author       = {{Bernergård, Axel and Mohlin, Erik}},
  issn         = {{0899-8256}},
  keywords     = {{Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies; Iterated admissibility; Payoff monotonicity; Convex monotonicity; Evolutionary dynamics; Replicator dynamic; C72; C73}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  pages        = {{82--97}},
  publisher    = {{Academic Press}},
  series       = {{Games and Economic Behavior}},
  title        = {{Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.009}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.009}},
  volume       = {{117}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}