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Rule-Following, Meaning Constitution and Enaction

Lo Presti, Patrizio LU (2015) In Human Affairs 25(1). p.110-120
Abstract
The paper submits a criticism of the standard formulation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox. According to the standard formulation, influenced by Kripke, the paradox invites us to consider what mental or behavioral items could constitute meaning. The author proposes instead an enactivist understanding of the paradox. On this account there is no essential gap between mental items and behavioral patterns such that the paradox enforces a choice between meaning being constituted either internally ‘in mind,’ or externally ‘in behavior.’ The paper begins with an introduction to the paradox and then presents arguments against standard solutions. It ends with the enactivist proposal, admitting that although much more needs to be said before... (More)
The paper submits a criticism of the standard formulation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox. According to the standard formulation, influenced by Kripke, the paradox invites us to consider what mental or behavioral items could constitute meaning. The author proposes instead an enactivist understanding of the paradox. On this account there is no essential gap between mental items and behavioral patterns such that the paradox enforces a choice between meaning being constituted either internally ‘in mind,’ or externally ‘in behavior.’ The paper begins with an introduction to the paradox and then presents arguments against standard solutions. It ends with the enactivist proposal, admitting that although much more needs to be said before it can be established as a full-fledged alternative, it nonetheless holds some promise both for revising our understanding of the paradox and for the formulation of a novel solution. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Wittgenstein, Rule-following, Meaning, Enaction, Interaction
in
Human Affairs
volume
25
issue
1
pages
110 - 120
publisher
De Gruyter
external identifiers
  • scopus:84924747157
ISSN
1337-401X
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
321718b5-abad-4e66-9e11-65730ec59d12 (old id 4856283)
alternative location
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/humaff.2015.25.issue-1/humaff-2015-0009/humaff-2015-0009.xml?format=INT
date added to LUP
2014-12-03 09:05:43
date last changed
2017-01-01 03:53:50
@article{321718b5-abad-4e66-9e11-65730ec59d12,
  abstract     = {The paper submits a criticism of the standard formulation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox. According to the standard formulation, influenced by Kripke, the paradox invites us to consider what mental or behavioral items could constitute meaning. The author proposes instead an enactivist understanding of the paradox. On this account there is no essential gap between mental items and behavioral patterns such that the paradox enforces a choice between meaning being constituted either internally ‘in mind,’ or externally ‘in behavior.’ The paper begins with an introduction to the paradox and then presents arguments against standard solutions. It ends with the enactivist proposal, admitting that although much more needs to be said before it can be established as a full-fledged alternative, it nonetheless holds some promise both for revising our understanding of the paradox and for the formulation of a novel solution.},
  author       = {Lo Presti, Patrizio},
  issn         = {1337-401X},
  keyword      = {Wittgenstein,Rule-following,Meaning,Enaction,Interaction},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {110--120},
  publisher    = {De Gruyter},
  series       = {Human Affairs},
  title        = {Rule-Following, Meaning Constitution and Enaction},
  volume       = {25},
  year         = {2015},
}