Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
(2015) In Journal of Economic Theory 157. p.349-383- Abstract
- We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we introduce the concept of a multiple single-peaked domain, where the set of alternatives is equipped with several underlying orderings with respect to which a preference can be single-peaked, and we argue that these domains are appropriate to represent preferences over political parties. Second, we define a domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences based on the condition of value-restricted preferences by Sen (1966). We provide complete characterizations of the strategy-proof social choice functions on both multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains. For both domains, we also identify the subclasses consisting of all... (More)
- We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we introduce the concept of a multiple single-peaked domain, where the set of alternatives is equipped with several underlying orderings with respect to which a preference can be single-peaked, and we argue that these domains are appropriate to represent preferences over political parties. Second, we define a domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences based on the condition of value-restricted preferences by Sen (1966). We provide complete characterizations of the strategy-proof social choice functions on both multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains. For both domains, we also identify the subclasses consisting of all anonymous strategy-proof social choice functions. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/4939121
- author
- Reffgen, Alexander LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2015
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Social choice function, Strategy-proofness, Single-peakedness, Spatial voting
- in
- Journal of Economic Theory
- volume
- 157
- pages
- 349 - 383
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000354593000015
- scopus:84927743050
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.010
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 9e034399-c35e-4b34-b044-61190561a5b5 (old id 4939121)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 11:02:28
- date last changed
- 2022-03-20 02:11:25
@article{9e034399-c35e-4b34-b044-61190561a5b5,
abstract = {{We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we introduce the concept of a multiple single-peaked domain, where the set of alternatives is equipped with several underlying orderings with respect to which a preference can be single-peaked, and we argue that these domains are appropriate to represent preferences over political parties. Second, we define a domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences based on the condition of value-restricted preferences by Sen (1966). We provide complete characterizations of the strategy-proof social choice functions on both multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains. For both domains, we also identify the subclasses consisting of all anonymous strategy-proof social choice functions.}},
author = {{Reffgen, Alexander}},
issn = {{0022-0531}},
keywords = {{Social choice function; Strategy-proofness; Single-peakedness; Spatial voting}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{349--383}},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
series = {{Journal of Economic Theory}},
title = {{Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.010}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.010}},
volume = {{157}},
year = {{2015}},
}