Punishment Moralism
(2024) In Ratio Juris 37(3). p.230-247- Abstract
In this paper, I try to reconcile the vulgar (normative) definition of punishment with the positivistic (purely descriptive) definition that separates the ethics of punishment from its definition—punishment positivism. I will argue that although the vulgar definition has critical issues, this does not mean that we should stop using normative concepts in the definition of punishment. I will attempt this reconciliation by considering one of the prime arguments in favour of punishment positivism—namely, definitional stop—and show why it doesn't work. I will proceed by presenting a functional argument in favour of what I call punishment moralism: the idea that punishment should be considered as a response to perceived wrongdoing. This... (More)
In this paper, I try to reconcile the vulgar (normative) definition of punishment with the positivistic (purely descriptive) definition that separates the ethics of punishment from its definition—punishment positivism. I will argue that although the vulgar definition has critical issues, this does not mean that we should stop using normative concepts in the definition of punishment. I will attempt this reconciliation by considering one of the prime arguments in favour of punishment positivism—namely, definitional stop—and show why it doesn't work. I will proceed by presenting a functional argument in favour of what I call punishment moralism: the idea that punishment should be considered as a response to perceived wrongdoing. This definition, while using normative concepts, still remains descriptive. In this way, I hope to be able to solve the problem of both views by combining their insights.
(Less)
- author
- MirzaeiGhazi, Shervin LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2024-09
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Ratio Juris
- volume
- 37
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 18 pages
- publisher
- Basil Blackwell
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85201074036
- ISSN
- 0952-1917
- DOI
- 10.1111/raju.12416
- project
- Lund Gothenburg Responsibility Project
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 4f97a335-3786-4317-b76d-38de77d44a59
- date added to LUP
- 2024-09-02 15:45:40
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 14:27:07
@article{4f97a335-3786-4317-b76d-38de77d44a59,
abstract = {{<p>In this paper, I try to reconcile the vulgar (normative) definition of punishment with the positivistic (purely descriptive) definition that separates the ethics of punishment from its definition—punishment positivism. I will argue that although the vulgar definition has critical issues, this does not mean that we should stop using normative concepts in the definition of punishment. I will attempt this reconciliation by considering one of the prime arguments in favour of punishment positivism—namely, definitional stop—and show why it doesn't work. I will proceed by presenting a functional argument in favour of what I call punishment moralism: the idea that punishment should be considered as a response to perceived wrongdoing. This definition, while using normative concepts, still remains descriptive. In this way, I hope to be able to solve the problem of both views by combining their insights.</p>}},
author = {{MirzaeiGhazi, Shervin}},
issn = {{0952-1917}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{230--247}},
publisher = {{Basil Blackwell}},
series = {{Ratio Juris}},
title = {{Punishment Moralism}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/raju.12416}},
doi = {{10.1111/raju.12416}},
volume = {{37}},
year = {{2024}},
}