The Fall of Reichenbach
(2014) 2014 Meeting of the Nordic Network for Philosophy of Science- Abstract
- Reichenbach’s constraint is the methodological imperative formulated by Reichenbach in the following passage:
“If we want to construct a philosophy of science, we have to distinguish
carefully between two kinds of context in which scientific theories may be
considered. The context of discovery is to be separated from the context of
justification; the former belongs to the psychology of scientific discovery,
the latter alone is to be the object of the logic of science.” (Reichenbach,
1938, p. 36.)
Reichenbach’s constraint is usually understood as barring epistemological models from attempting rational reconstructions of discovery processes. This paper... (More) - Reichenbach’s constraint is the methodological imperative formulated by Reichenbach in the following passage:
“If we want to construct a philosophy of science, we have to distinguish
carefully between two kinds of context in which scientific theories may be
considered. The context of discovery is to be separated from the context of
justification; the former belongs to the psychology of scientific discovery,
the latter alone is to be the object of the logic of science.” (Reichenbach,
1938, p. 36.)
Reichenbach’s constraint is usually understood as barring epistemological models from attempting rational reconstructions of discovery processes. This paper shows that Reichenbach’s constraint also bars epistemological models from capturing inquiry processes as genuine learning processes. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/5038701
- author
- Genot, Emmanuel LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2014
- type
- Contribution to conference
- publication status
- unpublished
- subject
- conference name
- 2014 Meeting of the Nordic Network for Philosophy of Science
- conference location
- Lund, Sweden
- conference dates
- 2014-03-27 - 2014-03-28
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 55f6f361-bcd9-41c8-99a5-55319cb04ef4 (old id 5038701)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 13:49:48
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 21:16:35
@misc{55f6f361-bcd9-41c8-99a5-55319cb04ef4,
abstract = {{Reichenbach’s constraint is the methodological imperative formulated by Reichenbach in the following passage: <br/><br>
<br/><br>
“If we want to construct a philosophy of science, we have to distinguish <br/><br>
carefully between two kinds of context in which scientific theories may be <br/><br>
considered. The context of discovery is to be separated from the context of <br/><br>
justification; the former belongs to the psychology of scientific discovery, <br/><br>
the latter alone is to be the object of the logic of science.” (Reichenbach, <br/><br>
1938, p. 36.) <br/><br>
<br/><br>
Reichenbach’s constraint is usually understood as barring epistemological models from attempting rational reconstructions of discovery processes. This paper shows that Reichenbach’s constraint also bars epistemological models from capturing inquiry processes as genuine learning processes.}},
author = {{Genot, Emmanuel}},
language = {{eng}},
title = {{The Fall of Reichenbach}},
year = {{2014}},
}