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An experimental investigation of lobbying and bribes

Gneezy, Uri ; Saccardo, Silvia and van Veldhuizen, Roel LU orcid (2025) In Experimental Economics 28(3).
Abstract
How do bribes and lobbying distort judgment? In our experiment, referees are tasked with judging a worker’s performance, and awarding a bonus to workers who score above a certain threshold. We find that bribes and lobbying are both distortionary, but in different ways. Whereas lobbying increases the number of workers receiving a bonus, bribes weaken the relationship between performance and success, with bonuses mostly being awarded to workers who bribe. We discuss implications for anti-corruption interventions.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
; and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
bribery, communication, corruption, lobbying, D73, C91, K42
in
Experimental Economics
volume
28
issue
3
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:105029341277
ISSN
1573-6938
DOI
10.1017/eec.2024.5
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
50802b97-47fb-499a-ace8-bc690f918f6f
date added to LUP
2026-03-03 15:26:12
date last changed
2026-03-04 08:39:40
@article{50802b97-47fb-499a-ace8-bc690f918f6f,
  abstract     = {{How do bribes and lobbying distort judgment? In our experiment, referees are tasked with judging a worker’s performance, and awarding a bonus to workers who score above a certain threshold. We find that bribes and lobbying are both distortionary, but in different ways. Whereas lobbying increases the number of workers receiving a bonus, bribes weaken the relationship between performance and success, with bonuses mostly being awarded to workers who bribe. We discuss implications for anti-corruption interventions.}},
  author       = {{Gneezy, Uri and Saccardo, Silvia and van Veldhuizen, Roel}},
  issn         = {{1573-6938}},
  keywords     = {{bribery; communication; corruption; lobbying; D73; C91; K42}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{04}},
  number       = {{3}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  series       = {{Experimental Economics}},
  title        = {{An experimental investigation of lobbying and bribes}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/eec.2024.5}},
  doi          = {{10.1017/eec.2024.5}},
  volume       = {{28}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}