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Non-Manipulable House Allocation with Rent Control Revisited

Andersson, Tommy LU and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU (2015) In Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
Abstract
This paper considers a house allocation problem with no initial ownership and where prices are bounded from below and above by exogenously given price restrictions. This type of housing market contains, e.g., the "assignment market" and the "student placement problem" as special cases. A mechanism called the minimal RPE mechanism is defined, and two main results are obtained. First, it is demonstrated that the mechanism is manipulable at some profile in the full preference domain. Second, it is proved that there is a subset of the full domain, containing almost all profiles in the full domain, such that the minimal RPE mechanism is strategy-proof in that subset.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Working paper/Preprint
publication status
published
subject
keywords
house allocation, matching, non-manipulability, preference domains
in
Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
issue
9
publisher
Department of Economics, Lund University
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
021dbfd2-77b1-40a2-80b4-a3448a74fb66 (old id 5268199)
alternative location
http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2015_009.htm
date added to LUP
2016-04-04 10:10:27
date last changed
2023-02-03 12:51:41
@misc{021dbfd2-77b1-40a2-80b4-a3448a74fb66,
  abstract     = {{This paper considers a house allocation problem with no initial ownership and where prices are bounded from below and above by exogenously given price restrictions. This type of housing market contains, e.g., the "assignment market" and the "student placement problem" as special cases. A mechanism called the minimal RPE mechanism is defined, and two main results are obtained. First, it is demonstrated that the mechanism is manipulable at some profile in the full preference domain. Second, it is proved that there is a subset of the full domain, containing almost all profiles in the full domain, such that the minimal RPE mechanism is strategy-proof in that subset.}},
  author       = {{Andersson, Tommy and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar}},
  keywords     = {{house allocation; matching; non-manipulability; preference domains}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Working Paper}},
  number       = {{9}},
  publisher    = {{Department of Economics, Lund University}},
  series       = {{Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University}},
  title        = {{Non-Manipulable House Allocation with Rent Control Revisited}},
  url          = {{http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2015_009.htm}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}