The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism
Olsson, Erik J LU ; Tjøstheim, Trond A. LU ; Stephens, Andreas LU
; Schwaninger, Arthur
and Roszko, Maximilian
LU
(2023)
In Acta Analytica
38.
p.417-438
- Abstract
- The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. The problem arises for reliabilism in particular, i.e., the externalist view that knowledge amounts to reliably acquired true belief. Goldman and Olsson argue that knowledge, in this sense, is more valuable than mere true belief due to the higher likelihood of future true beliefs (produced by the same reliable process) in the case of knowledge. They maintain that their solution works given four empirical assumptions, which they claim hold “normally.” However, they do not show that their assumptions are externalistically acceptable; nor do they provide detailed evidence for their normality claim. We address these remaining gaps... (More)
- The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. The problem arises for reliabilism in particular, i.e., the externalist view that knowledge amounts to reliably acquired true belief. Goldman and Olsson argue that knowledge, in this sense, is more valuable than mere true belief due to the higher likelihood of future true beliefs (produced by the same reliable process) in the case of knowledge. They maintain that their solution works given four empirical assumptions, which they claim hold “normally.” However, they do not show that their assumptions are externalistically acceptable; nor do they provide detailed evidence for their normality claim. We address these remaining gaps in Goldman and Olsson’s solution in a constructive spirit. In particular, we suggest an externalist interpretation of the assumptions such that they essentially spell out what it means for a broad range of organisms capable of belief-like representations to be epistemically adapted to their environment. Our investigation also sheds light on the circumstances in which the assumptions fail to hold and knowledge therefore fails to have extra value in Goldman and Olsson’s sense. The upshot is a deeper understanding of their solution as a contribution to naturalized epistemology and a strengthened case for its empirical validity. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/5343551a-e2ba-432f-997d-864cb2202639
- author
- Olsson, Erik J
LU
; Tjøstheim, Trond A.
LU
; Stephens, Andreas
LU
; Schwaninger, Arthur
and Roszko, Maximilian
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2023
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Value problem, Conditional probability solution, Reliabilism, Naturalized epistemology, Cognitive science
- in
- Acta Analytica
- volume
- 38
- pages
- 22 pages
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85139508964
- ISSN
- 0353-5150
- DOI
- 10.1007/s12136-022-00533-0
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 5343551a-e2ba-432f-997d-864cb2202639
- date added to LUP
- 2022-09-20 14:35:59
- date last changed
- 2023-08-08 15:47:05
@article{5343551a-e2ba-432f-997d-864cb2202639,
abstract = {{The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. The problem arises for reliabilism in particular, i.e., the externalist view that knowledge amounts to reliably acquired true belief. Goldman and Olsson argue that knowledge, in this sense, is more valuable than mere true belief due to the higher likelihood of future true beliefs (produced by the same reliable process) in the case of knowledge. They maintain that their solution works given four empirical assumptions, which they claim hold “normally.” However, they do not show that their assumptions are externalistically acceptable; nor do they provide detailed evidence for their normality claim. We address these remaining gaps in Goldman and Olsson’s solution in a constructive spirit. In particular, we suggest an externalist interpretation of the assumptions such that they essentially spell out what it means for a broad range of organisms capable of belief-like representations to be epistemically adapted to their environment. Our investigation also sheds light on the circumstances in which the assumptions fail to hold and knowledge therefore fails to have extra value in Goldman and Olsson’s sense. The upshot is a deeper understanding of their solution as a contribution to naturalized epistemology and a strengthened case for its empirical validity.}},
author = {{Olsson, Erik J and Tjøstheim, Trond A. and Stephens, Andreas and Schwaninger, Arthur and Roszko, Maximilian}},
issn = {{0353-5150}},
keywords = {{Value problem; Conditional probability solution; Reliabilism; Naturalized epistemology; Cognitive science}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{417--438}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Acta Analytica}},
title = {{The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00533-0}},
doi = {{10.1007/s12136-022-00533-0}},
volume = {{38}},
year = {{2023}},
}