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Electoral Cycles in Government Policy Making : Strategic Timing of Austerity Reform Measures in Western Europe

Strobl, Daniel ; Bäck, Hanna LU orcid ; Müller, Wolfgang C. and Angelova, Mariyana (2021) In British Journal of Political Science 51(1). p.331-352
Abstract

This article investigates whether governing parties strategically time austerity policies to help them win re-election. It contributes to existing research by focusing directly on government policy output, analyzing over 1,200 welfare and taxation austerity measures in thirteen Western European countries over twenty years. In line with previous research, the authors find that governments become less likely to introduce austerity measures as elections approach. The study introduces original hypotheses about which governments have the ability and opportunity to strategically time policy decisions. The authors suggest that minimal winning cabinets with leadership change (new prime ministers) face less complex bargaining environments and... (More)

This article investigates whether governing parties strategically time austerity policies to help them win re-election. It contributes to existing research by focusing directly on government policy output, analyzing over 1,200 welfare and taxation austerity measures in thirteen Western European countries over twenty years. In line with previous research, the authors find that governments become less likely to introduce austerity measures as elections approach. The study introduces original hypotheses about which governments have the ability and opportunity to strategically time policy decisions. The authors suggest that minimal winning cabinets with leadership change (new prime ministers) face less complex bargaining environments and can credibly shift responsibility for austerity measures to the preceding government. The empirical analyses show that these governments are most likely to strategically time austerity policies.

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Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
; ; and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
austerity reforms, electoral cycles, social policy, taxation policy, Western Europe
in
British Journal of Political Science
volume
51
issue
1
pages
22 pages
publisher
Cambridge University Press
external identifiers
  • scopus:85099957891
ISSN
0007-1234
DOI
10.1017/S0007123419000073
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
5893a135-19e1-44ac-a31a-4c76884cd411
date added to LUP
2021-02-08 12:55:23
date last changed
2024-02-17 14:26:43
@article{5893a135-19e1-44ac-a31a-4c76884cd411,
  abstract     = {{<p>This article investigates whether governing parties strategically time austerity policies to help them win re-election. It contributes to existing research by focusing directly on government policy output, analyzing over 1,200 welfare and taxation austerity measures in thirteen Western European countries over twenty years. In line with previous research, the authors find that governments become less likely to introduce austerity measures as elections approach. The study introduces original hypotheses about which governments have the ability and opportunity to strategically time policy decisions. The authors suggest that minimal winning cabinets with leadership change (new prime ministers) face less complex bargaining environments and can credibly shift responsibility for austerity measures to the preceding government. The empirical analyses show that these governments are most likely to strategically time austerity policies. </p>}},
  author       = {{Strobl, Daniel and Bäck, Hanna and Müller, Wolfgang C. and Angelova, Mariyana}},
  issn         = {{0007-1234}},
  keywords     = {{austerity reforms; electoral cycles; social policy; taxation policy; Western Europe}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{331--352}},
  publisher    = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  series       = {{British Journal of Political Science}},
  title        = {{Electoral Cycles in Government Policy Making : Strategic Timing of Austerity Reform Measures in Western Europe}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000073}},
  doi          = {{10.1017/S0007123419000073}},
  volume       = {{51}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}