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Social Networks and Reputation Incentives: Does Directorship Prestige Influence Effort?

Intintoli, Vincent J and Moursli, Reda LU (2024) In European Financial Management
Abstract
Using social network theory, we measure the reputation of boards and directors based on the centrality of their respective networks. Directors commit greater effort, as measured by actual director attendance rates, to directorships they consider more prestigious. Results are robust to controlling for standard proxies of reputation as well as using alternative measures of centrality to identify prestigious directorships. We find similar results when examining exogenous shocks to relative directorship rankings; effort improves for directorships that increase in ranking following the shock. Our findings outline the importance directors place on the perceived reputational value of their directorships.
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author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
epub
subject
keywords
Centrality measures, Director connectedness, Firm reputation, Independent directors, Social networks, Director incentives
in
European Financial Management
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN
1354-7798
DOI
10.1111/eufm.12512
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
5da2b61b-6fd8-495c-87a3-04bc6ea5244a
date added to LUP
2024-08-16 16:07:01
date last changed
2024-08-19 09:11:26
@article{5da2b61b-6fd8-495c-87a3-04bc6ea5244a,
  abstract     = {{Using social network theory, we measure the reputation of boards and directors based on the centrality of their respective networks. Directors commit greater effort, as measured by actual director attendance rates, to directorships they consider more prestigious. Results are robust to controlling for standard proxies of reputation as well as using alternative measures of centrality to identify prestigious directorships. We find similar results when examining exogenous shocks to relative directorship rankings; effort improves for directorships that increase in ranking following the shock. Our findings outline the importance directors place on the perceived reputational value of their directorships.}},
  author       = {{Intintoli, Vincent J and Moursli, Reda}},
  issn         = {{1354-7798}},
  keywords     = {{Centrality measures; Director connectedness; Firm reputation; Independent directors; Social networks; Director incentives}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{08}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
  series       = {{European Financial Management}},
  title        = {{Social Networks and Reputation Incentives: Does Directorship Prestige Influence Effort?}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12512}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/eufm.12512}},
  year         = {{2024}},
}