Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge
(2022) In Journal for General Philosophy of Science 53(1). p.41-60- Abstract
- It has been argued that much of contemporary epistemology can be unified under Carnap’s methodology of explication, which originated in the neighboring field of philosophy of science. However, it is unclear to what extent epistemological theories that emphasize the explanatory role of knowledge fit into this picture, Kornblith’s natural kind epistemology and Williamson’s knowledge first approach being cases in point. In this connection, I raise three questions. Can we harvest the insights of these approaches without loss in the more standard and less idiosyncratic explicationist framework? Can we do so without falling prey to prominent criticism raised against those approaches? Finally, do the approaches come out as coherent under an... (More)
- It has been argued that much of contemporary epistemology can be unified under Carnap’s methodology of explication, which originated in the neighboring field of philosophy of science. However, it is unclear to what extent epistemological theories that emphasize the explanatory role of knowledge fit into this picture, Kornblith’s natural kind epistemology and Williamson’s knowledge first approach being cases in point. In this connection, I raise three questions. Can we harvest the insights of these approaches without loss in the more standard and less idiosyncratic explicationist framework? Can we do so without falling prey to prominent criticism raised against those approaches? Finally, do the approaches come out as coherent under an explicationist rendering? I argue that in Kornblith’s case the answer to all three questions is essentially in the affirmative. Much of the knowledge first approach is also translatable into explicationism. However, from that perspective, Williamson’s central argument for treating knowledge as undefinable, referring to persistent yet unsuccessful attempts to solve the Gettier problem, amounts to an overreaction to that problem. Leaving explicationism aside, I ask, in the penultimate section, what Williamson’s own philosophical method really amounts to. (Less)
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- author
- Olsson, Erik J LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2022
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Explication, Rudolf Carnap, Timothy Williamson, Hilary Kornblith, Knowledge first, Natural kind
- in
- Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- volume
- 53
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 41 - 60
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85104059430
- ISSN
- 1572-8587
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10838-020-09520-8
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 62c8507e-fc83-4b81-bdc0-45a19cf3e3c7
- date added to LUP
- 2020-07-24 22:55:10
- date last changed
- 2023-10-03 12:55:30
@article{62c8507e-fc83-4b81-bdc0-45a19cf3e3c7,
abstract = {{It has been argued that much of contemporary epistemology can be unified under Carnap’s methodology of explication, which originated in the neighboring field of philosophy of science. However, it is unclear to what extent epistemological theories that emphasize the explanatory role of knowledge fit into this picture, Kornblith’s natural kind epistemology and Williamson’s knowledge first approach being cases in point. In this connection, I raise three questions. Can we harvest the insights of these approaches without loss in the more standard and less idiosyncratic explicationist framework? Can we do so without falling prey to prominent criticism raised against those approaches? Finally, do the approaches come out as coherent under an explicationist rendering? I argue that in Kornblith’s case the answer to all three questions is essentially in the affirmative. Much of the knowledge first approach is also translatable into explicationism. However, from that perspective, Williamson’s central argument for treating knowledge as undefinable, referring to persistent yet unsuccessful attempts to solve the Gettier problem, amounts to an overreaction to that problem. Leaving explicationism aside, I ask, in the penultimate section, what Williamson’s own philosophical method really amounts to.}},
author = {{Olsson, Erik J}},
issn = {{1572-8587}},
keywords = {{Explication; Rudolf Carnap; Timothy Williamson; Hilary Kornblith; Knowledge first; Natural kind}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{41--60}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Journal for General Philosophy of Science}},
title = {{Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-020-09520-8}},
doi = {{10.1007/s10838-020-09520-8}},
volume = {{53}},
year = {{2022}},
}