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A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

Andersson, Ola LU and Wengström, Erik LU (2007) In Economics Letters 95(3). p.398-401
Abstract
Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WW) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
repeated, noncooperative game theory, weak renegotiation-proofness, bertrand games
in
Economics Letters
volume
95
issue
3
pages
398 - 401
publisher
Elsevier
external identifiers
  • wos:000247149000014
  • scopus:34248584416
ISSN
0165-1765
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
5f9995af-0187-4a6e-827d-92cb2a2c55d7 (old id 648936)
date added to LUP
2007-12-05 15:49:55
date last changed
2017-01-01 05:17:43
@article{5f9995af-0187-4a6e-827d-92cb2a2c55d7,
  abstract     = {Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WW) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
  author       = {Andersson, Ola and Wengström, Erik},
  issn         = {0165-1765},
  keyword      = {repeated,noncooperative game theory,weak renegotiation-proofness,bertrand games},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {398--401},
  publisher    = {Elsevier},
  series       = {Economics Letters},
  title        = {A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014},
  volume       = {95},
  year         = {2007},
}