Skip to main content

Lund University Publications

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain

Larsson, Bo LU and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU (2006) In Mathematical Social Sciences 52(3). p.272-287
Abstract
In analyses of strategy-proof voting, two results feature prominently: the dictatorial characterization contained in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and the voting by committees characterization in the Barbera-Sonnenschein-Zhou theorem. The two theorems are based on voting procedures defined on the domain of strict preferences. In the present study, we derive corresponding results for voting schemes defined on the full domain of weak preferences and obtain a characterization by means of a combination of sequential dictatorship and voting by extended committees.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Barbers-Sonnenschein-Zhou theorem, strategy-proof voting, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
in
Mathematical Social Sciences
volume
52
issue
3
pages
272 - 287
publisher
Elsevier
external identifiers
  • wos:000242553700004
  • scopus:33750530589
ISSN
0165-4896
DOI
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.008
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
9476ea98-466b-4339-a792-5267867ec07b (old id 683598)
date added to LUP
2016-04-01 16:08:03
date last changed
2020-11-22 05:03:24
@article{9476ea98-466b-4339-a792-5267867ec07b,
  abstract     = {In analyses of strategy-proof voting, two results feature prominently: the dictatorial characterization contained in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and the voting by committees characterization in the Barbera-Sonnenschein-Zhou theorem. The two theorems are based on voting procedures defined on the domain of strict preferences. In the present study, we derive corresponding results for voting schemes defined on the full domain of weak preferences and obtain a characterization by means of a combination of sequential dictatorship and voting by extended committees.},
  author       = {Larsson, Bo and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar},
  issn         = {0165-4896},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {272--287},
  publisher    = {Elsevier},
  series       = {Mathematical Social Sciences},
  title        = {Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.008},
  doi          = {10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.008},
  volume       = {52},
  year         = {2006},
}