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Sovereignty and the Personality of the State

Bartelson, Jens LU (2015) In The Concept of the State in International Relations: p.81-107
Abstract
n international law, states are assumed to be persons by virtue of being bearers of rights and obligations. This chapter provides a brief genealogy of the person of the state. It shows how the concept of sovereignty — first understood as supreme and indivisible authority within a given polity — helped early modern authors to account for the temporal continuity of states, and also allowed them to attribute rights and obligations to such fictitious entities. It then shows how this conception of sovereignty was instrumental when attributing a capacity for autonomous action to the natural person of sovereign, and how the subsequent redefinition of sovereignty in terms of external independence helped to relocate that capacity to the state as a... (More)
n international law, states are assumed to be persons by virtue of being bearers of rights and obligations. This chapter provides a brief genealogy of the person of the state. It shows how the concept of sovereignty — first understood as supreme and indivisible authority within a given polity — helped early modern authors to account for the temporal continuity of states, and also allowed them to attribute rights and obligations to such fictitious entities. It then shows how this conception of sovereignty was instrumental when attributing a capacity for autonomous action to the natural person of sovereign, and how the subsequent redefinition of sovereignty in terms of external independence helped to relocate that capacity to the state as a whole. Finally, it describes how this view of the state as an independent entity came to constitute the baseline for the theory of recognition, according to which states take on their personality as a consequence of being recognized as persons by other states. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
in
The Concept of the State in International Relations:
editor
Schuett, Robert; Stirk, Peter M. R.; and
pages
81 - 107
publisher
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
external identifiers
  • scopus:84971320523
ISBN
0748693629
DOI
10.3366/edinburgh/9780748693627.003.0004
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
6b133201-9053-40ff-a58d-325089b78b05
date added to LUP
2016-05-10 16:17:00
date last changed
2017-07-09 04:50:13
@inbook{6b133201-9053-40ff-a58d-325089b78b05,
  abstract     = {n international law, states are assumed to be persons by virtue of being bearers of rights and obligations. This chapter provides a brief genealogy of the person of the state. It shows how the concept of sovereignty — first understood as supreme and indivisible authority within a given polity — helped early modern authors to account for the temporal continuity of states, and also allowed them to attribute rights and obligations to such fictitious entities. It then shows how this conception of sovereignty was instrumental when attributing a capacity for autonomous action to the natural person of sovereign, and how the subsequent redefinition of sovereignty in terms of external independence helped to relocate that capacity to the state as a whole. Finally, it describes how this view of the state as an independent entity came to constitute the baseline for the theory of recognition, according to which states take on their personality as a consequence of being recognized as persons by other states.},
  author       = {Bartelson, Jens},
  editor       = {Schuett, Robert and Stirk, Peter M. R.},
  isbn         = {0748693629},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {81--107},
  publisher    = {Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press},
  series       = {The Concept of the State in International Relations:},
  title        = {Sovereignty and the Personality of the State},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748693627.003.0004},
  year         = {2015},
}