Hur bör vi reglera självständiga centralbanker? Riksbanken och den penningpolitiska verktygslådan.
(2024) In Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 126(1). p.27-52- Abstract (Swedish)
- How should we regulate independent central banks? The Riksbank and its
monetary policy toolkit .Within what boundaries are independent central banks allowed to operate? This question is seldom discussed but has gained prominence due to the changes in monetary policy since the 2008/09 financial crisis. Notably, the Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, along with other central banks, has expanded its monetary policy toolkit to include so-called quantitative easing—primarily the purchase of securities, mainly bonds. Originally conceived as crisis instruments, these balance sheet measures have increasingly been embraced as monetary policy tools for stabilizing both the economic cycle and inflation. A growing body of literature suggests... (More) - How should we regulate independent central banks? The Riksbank and its
monetary policy toolkit .Within what boundaries are independent central banks allowed to operate? This question is seldom discussed but has gained prominence due to the changes in monetary policy since the 2008/09 financial crisis. Notably, the Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, along with other central banks, has expanded its monetary policy toolkit to include so-called quantitative easing—primarily the purchase of securities, mainly bonds. Originally conceived as crisis instruments, these balance sheet measures have increasingly been embraced as monetary policy tools for stabilizing both the economic cycle and inflation. A growing body of literature suggests that these measures carry numerous adverse side-effects on the macroeconomy, and risk extending monetary policy beyond the original constraints set when the Riksbank gained independence in the 1990s. This article problematizes this evolution and raises the question of whether the monetary policy framework needs to be updated to limit the discretionary space of an independent Riksbank. The article concludes with a discussion on what potential reforms to this framework might entail. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/70df458b-35f5-4292-9386-8d168b098ea9
- author
- Andersson, Fredrik N G LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2024-03-27
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- penningpolitik, riksbank, centralbank, balansräkningsåtgärder, styrränta, kvantitativa lättnader, quantitative easing, finansiell stabilitet, inflation
- in
- Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift
- volume
- 126
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 27 - 52
- publisher
- Fahlbeckska stiftelsen
- ISSN
- 0039-0747
- language
- Swedish
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 70df458b-35f5-4292-9386-8d168b098ea9
- alternative location
- https://journals.lub.lu.se/st/issue/view/3525
- date added to LUP
- 2024-03-27 12:19:30
- date last changed
- 2024-03-27 12:47:44
@article{70df458b-35f5-4292-9386-8d168b098ea9,
abstract = {{How should we regulate independent central banks? The Riksbank and its <br/>monetary policy toolkit .Within what boundaries are independent central banks allowed to operate? This question is seldom discussed but has gained prominence due to the changes in monetary policy since the 2008/09 financial crisis. Notably, the Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, along with other central banks, has expanded its monetary policy toolkit to include so-called quantitative easing—primarily the purchase of securities, mainly bonds. Originally conceived as crisis instruments, these balance sheet measures have increasingly been embraced as monetary policy tools for stabilizing both the economic cycle and inflation. A growing body of literature suggests that these measures carry numerous adverse side-effects on the macroeconomy, and risk extending monetary policy beyond the original constraints set when the Riksbank gained independence in the 1990s. This article problematizes this evolution and raises the question of whether the monetary policy framework needs to be updated to limit the discretionary space of an independent Riksbank. The article concludes with a discussion on what potential reforms to this framework might entail.}},
author = {{Andersson, Fredrik N G}},
issn = {{0039-0747}},
keywords = {{penningpolitik; riksbank; centralbank; balansräkningsåtgärder; styrränta; kvantitativa lättnader; quantitative easing; finansiell stabilitet; inflation}},
language = {{swe}},
month = {{03}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{27--52}},
publisher = {{Fahlbeckska stiftelsen}},
series = {{Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift}},
title = {{Hur bör vi reglera självständiga centralbanker? Riksbanken och den penningpolitiska verktygslådan.}},
url = {{https://journals.lub.lu.se/st/issue/view/3525}},
volume = {{126}},
year = {{2024}},
}