A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication
(1991) 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991 In IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings p.180-180- Abstract
New bounds are derived for the probabilities of successful attack on multiple authentication schemes by removing the frequently assumed 'freshness' constraint on the source states. We prove that the overall probability of successful deception, PD(L), for a sequences of L uses of the authentication channel, is bounded from below by max(k/v, 1/√b). We also show that if PD{L) = 1/√b, then the key entropy is lower bounded by 1/2(L + l)log2 b bits and that this bound is tight.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/71089128-2ff6-4afe-b65f-0d80c820f300
- author
- Smeets, Ben LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 1991
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- Proceedings 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
- series title
- IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
- article number
- 695236
- pages
- 1 pages
- publisher
- IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
- conference name
- 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 1991
- conference location
- Budapest, Hungary
- conference dates
- 1991-06-24 - 1991-06-28
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85067506484
- ISSN
- 2157-8095
- ISBN
- 0780300564
- DOI
- 10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- additional info
- Publisher Copyright: © 1991 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. All rights reserved.
- id
- 71089128-2ff6-4afe-b65f-0d80c820f300
- date added to LUP
- 2021-11-05 02:26:32
- date last changed
- 2021-11-10 12:48:18
@inproceedings{71089128-2ff6-4afe-b65f-0d80c820f300, abstract = {{<p>New bounds are derived for the probabilities of successful attack on multiple authentication schemes by removing the frequently assumed 'freshness' constraint on the source states. We prove that the overall probability of successful deception, P<sub>D</sub>(L), for a sequences of L uses of the authentication channel, is bounded from below by max(k/v, 1/√b). We also show that if P<sub>D</sub>{L) = 1/√b, then the key entropy is lower bounded by 1/2(L + l)log<sub>2</sub> b bits and that this bound is tight.</p>}}, author = {{Smeets, Ben}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings 1991 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory}}, isbn = {{0780300564}}, issn = {{2157-8095}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{180--180}}, publisher = {{IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.}}, series = {{IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings}}, title = {{A lower bound on the probability of deception in multiple authentication}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236}}, doi = {{10.1109/ISIT.1991.695236}}, year = {{1991}}, }