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Is hypothetical consent a substitute for actual consent?

Broström, Linus LU and Johansson, Mats LU (2007) In Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz
Abstract
The so-called Substituted Judgment Standard is one of several competing principles on how certain health care decisions ought to be made for patients who are not themselves capable of making decisions of the relevant kind. It says that a surrogate decision-maker, acting on behalf of the patient, ought to make the decision the patient would have made, had the latter been competent. The most common way of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard is to maintain that this standard protects patients’ right to autonomy, or self-determination, in the situation where they are no longer able to exercise this right on their own. In this paper we question this justification, by arguing that the most commonly suggested moral reasons for allowing... (More)
The so-called Substituted Judgment Standard is one of several competing principles on how certain health care decisions ought to be made for patients who are not themselves capable of making decisions of the relevant kind. It says that a surrogate decision-maker, acting on behalf of the patient, ought to make the decision the patient would have made, had the latter been competent. The most common way of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard is to maintain that this standard protects patients’ right to autonomy, or self-determination, in the situation where they are no longer able to exercise this right on their own. In this paper we question this justification, by arguing that the most commonly suggested moral reasons for allowing and encouraging people to make their own choices seem not to apply when the patient’s decision-making is merely hypothetical. We end with some brief sketches of possible alternative ways of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Substituted judgment standard, self-determination, autonomy, incompetence
in
Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz
publisher
Department of Philosophy, Lund University
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
bd112749-0471-4df6-833f-7b9b517c0b5f (old id 737044)
alternative location
http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/Brostrom&Johansson.pdf
date added to LUP
2007-12-11 13:20:46
date last changed
2016-04-16 10:07:16
@inbook{bd112749-0471-4df6-833f-7b9b517c0b5f,
  abstract     = {The so-called Substituted Judgment Standard is one of several competing principles on how certain health care decisions ought to be made for patients who are not themselves capable of making decisions of the relevant kind. It says that a surrogate decision-maker, acting on behalf of the patient, ought to make the decision the patient would have made, had the latter been competent. The most common way of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard is to maintain that this standard protects patients’ right to autonomy, or self-determination, in the situation where they are no longer able to exercise this right on their own. In this paper we question this justification, by arguing that the most commonly suggested moral reasons for allowing and encouraging people to make their own choices seem not to apply when the patient’s decision-making is merely hypothetical. We end with some brief sketches of possible alternative ways of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard.},
  author       = {Broström, Linus and Johansson, Mats},
  keyword      = {Substituted judgment standard,self-determination,autonomy,incompetence},
  language     = {eng},
  publisher    = {Department of Philosophy, Lund University},
  series       = {Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz},
  title        = {Is hypothetical consent a substitute for actual consent?},
  year         = {2007},
}