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Registered Replication Report : Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)

Bouwmeester, Sjoerd; Verkoeijen, Peter P.J.L.; Aczel, Balazs; Barbosa, Fernando Jr.; Bègue, L.; Brañas-Garza, P.; Chmura, T. G.H.; Cornelissen, G.; Døssing, F. S. and Espín, A. M., et al. (2017) In Perspectives on Psychological Science 12(3). p.527-542
Abstract

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of... (More)

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.

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cooperation, decision making, economic games, replication, social heuristic hypothesis, social psychology
in
Perspectives on Psychological Science
volume
12
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3
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16 pages
publisher
SAGE Publications Ltd
external identifiers
  • scopus:85019734453
  • wos:000401970400012
ISSN
1745-6916
DOI
10.1177/1745691617693624
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English
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yes
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2017-10-30 16:28:08
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@article{763c232b-3800-4e21-bb16-8cb9639a0d2e,
  abstract     = {<p>In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene &amp; Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen &amp; Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.</p>},
  author       = {Bouwmeester, Sjoerd and Verkoeijen, Peter P.J.L. and Aczel, Balazs and Barbosa, Fernando Jr. and Bègue, L. and Brañas-Garza, P. and Chmura, T. G.H. and Cornelissen, G. and Døssing, F. S. and Espín, A. M. and Evans, Anne M. and Ferreira-Santos, F. and Fiedler, S. and Flegr, J. and Ghaffari, M. and Glöckner, A. and Goeschl, T. and Guo, L. and Hauser, O. P. and Hernan-Gonzalez, R. and Herrero, A and Horne, Z. and Houdek, P and Johannesson, Magnus and Koppel, Lina and Kujal, P. and Laine, Tanja M. and Lohse, M J and Martins, E. C. and Mauro, C. and Mischkowski, D. and Mukherjee, S and Myrseth, K.O.R. and Navarro-Martínez, D. and Neal, T. M.S. and Novakova, J. J. and Pagà, R. and Paiva, T. O. and Palfi, Bence and Piovesan, Marco and Rahal, R. M. and Salomon, Eva and Srinivasan, N. and Srivastava, A. and Szaszi, Barnabas and Szollosi, Aba and Thor, K. and Tinghög, Gustav and Trueblood, J. S. and Van Bavel, Jan and van ‘t Veer, A. E. and Västfjäll, Daniel and Warner, Margret and Wengström, Erik and Wills, J. and Wollbrant, C. E.},
  issn         = {1745-6916},
  keyword      = {cooperation,decision making,economic games,replication,social heuristic hypothesis,social psychology},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {05},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {527--542},
  publisher    = {SAGE Publications Ltd},
  series       = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},
  title        = {Registered Replication Report : Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691617693624},
  volume       = {12},
  year         = {2017},
}