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Compromises and Rewards: Stable and Non-manipulable Probabilistic Pairing

Gudmundsson, Jens LU (2015) In Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
Abstract
Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in pairing problems by selecting lotteries over matchings?We examine the problem of eliciting preferences to make pairs as introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). We develop ex-ante notions of stability and non-manipulability that are parameterized by collections of utility functions. In particular, we study the collection of utility functions with increasing differences for which stability and non-manipulability turn out to characterize Compromises and Rewards. This is a novel rule that is fundamentally different from the one that has attracted most attention in the literature, Deferred Acceptance.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Working paper/Preprint
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Rewards, Compromises, Non-manipulability, Stability, Lottery, Pairing
in
Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
issue
32
pages
27 pages
publisher
Department of Economics, Lund University
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
e0077c87-0689-4703-9264-1abadeb554f1 (old id 8230888)
alternative location
http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2015_032.htm
date added to LUP
2016-04-04 11:48:57
date last changed
2018-11-21 21:07:23
@misc{e0077c87-0689-4703-9264-1abadeb554f1,
  abstract     = {{Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in pairing problems by selecting lotteries over matchings?We examine the problem of eliciting preferences to make pairs as introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). We develop ex-ante notions of stability and non-manipulability that are parameterized by collections of utility functions. In particular, we study the collection of utility functions with increasing differences for which stability and non-manipulability turn out to characterize Compromises and Rewards. This is a novel rule that is fundamentally different from the one that has attracted most attention in the literature, Deferred Acceptance.}},
  author       = {{Gudmundsson, Jens}},
  keywords     = {{Rewards; Compromises; Non-manipulability; Stability; Lottery; Pairing}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Working Paper}},
  number       = {{32}},
  publisher    = {{Department of Economics, Lund University}},
  series       = {{Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University}},
  title        = {{Compromises and Rewards: Stable and Non-manipulable Probabilistic Pairing}},
  url          = {{http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2015_032.htm}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}