Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings
(2020) In Scandinavian Journal of Economics 122(3). p.937-965- Abstract
- In this paper, we investigate the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, we demonstrate that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, we investigate a specific matching system, and we propose an easy‐to‐implement mechanism that finds an efficient, stable, and maximum matching. Such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees, and that no refugee prefers another specific landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to their own current match.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/8269c135-0745-41c9-9cce-126581f54a6c
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU and Ehlers, Lars LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2020-07
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- volume
- 122
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 29 pages
- publisher
- Wiley-Blackwell
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85074663110
- ISSN
- 1467-9442
- DOI
- 10.1111/sjoe.12362
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 8269c135-0745-41c9-9cce-126581f54a6c
- date added to LUP
- 2019-04-12 16:09:28
- date last changed
- 2024-09-19 11:51:25
@article{8269c135-0745-41c9-9cce-126581f54a6c, abstract = {{In this paper, we investigate the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, we demonstrate that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, we investigate a specific matching system, and we propose an easy‐to‐implement mechanism that finds an efficient, stable, and maximum matching. Such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees, and that no refugee prefers another specific landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to their own current match.}}, author = {{Andersson, Tommy and Ehlers, Lars}}, issn = {{1467-9442}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{937--965}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, series = {{Scandinavian Journal of Economics}}, title = {{Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12362}}, doi = {{10.1111/sjoe.12362}}, volume = {{122}}, year = {{2020}}, }