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A predatory democracy? An essay on taxation in classical Athens

Lyttkens, Carl Hampus LU (1994) In Explorations in Economic History 31(1). p.62-90
Abstract
Predatory rule is defined here as a tendency to maximize state revenue, subject to the rulers′ relative bargaining power and transaction costs (Levi, M., 1988, Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: Univ. California Press; North, D. C., 1981, Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton). I suggest that the implicit bargaining between Athenian "politicians" and the poor majority generated predatory rule and that this framework improves our understanding of taxation in democratic Athens. For example, it is shown that the choice of taxes and their organization served to economize on transaction costs and that the bargaining power of the rich together with the notion of quasi-voluntary compliance may help to explain the changes in... (More)
Predatory rule is defined here as a tendency to maximize state revenue, subject to the rulers′ relative bargaining power and transaction costs (Levi, M., 1988, Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: Univ. California Press; North, D. C., 1981, Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton). I suggest that the implicit bargaining between Athenian "politicians" and the poor majority generated predatory rule and that this framework improves our understanding of taxation in democratic Athens. For example, it is shown that the choice of taxes and their organization served to economize on transaction costs and that the bargaining power of the rich together with the notion of quasi-voluntary compliance may help to explain the changes in taxation of wealth. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Explorations in Economic History
volume
31
issue
1
pages
62 - 90
publisher
Elsevier
external identifiers
  • scopus:38149145793
ISSN
0014-4983
DOI
10.1006/exeh.1994.1003
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
3c31f4ea-db7b-477a-82ca-6d56cad20a34 (old id 8314969)
date added to LUP
2015-12-17 10:56:46
date last changed
2017-09-10 04:40:05
@article{3c31f4ea-db7b-477a-82ca-6d56cad20a34,
  abstract     = {Predatory rule is defined here as a tendency to maximize state revenue, subject to the rulers′ relative bargaining power and transaction costs (Levi, M., 1988, Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: Univ. California Press; North, D. C., 1981, Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton). I suggest that the implicit bargaining between Athenian "politicians" and the poor majority generated predatory rule and that this framework improves our understanding of taxation in democratic Athens. For example, it is shown that the choice of taxes and their organization served to economize on transaction costs and that the bargaining power of the rich together with the notion of quasi-voluntary compliance may help to explain the changes in taxation of wealth.},
  author       = {Lyttkens, Carl Hampus},
  issn         = {0014-4983},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {62--90},
  publisher    = {Elsevier},
  series       = {Explorations in Economic History},
  title        = {A predatory democracy? An essay on taxation in classical Athens},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/exeh.1994.1003},
  volume       = {31},
  year         = {1994},
}