From reasonable preferences, via argumentation, to logic
(2016) In Journal of Applied Logic 18. p.105-128- Abstract
- This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms (i.e., game trees) and proof trees. Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus... (More)
- This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms (i.e., game trees) and proof trees. Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/872b5c1c-ece6-422a-8888-1d988a393779
- author
- Jacot, Justine LU ; Genot, Emmanuel LU and Zenker, Frank LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2016
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Pragma-dialectics, Game semantics, Logic
- in
- Journal of Applied Logic
- volume
- 18
- pages
- 105 - 128
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84988353946
- wos:000384954600005
- ISSN
- 1570-8683
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jal.2016.08.001
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 872b5c1c-ece6-422a-8888-1d988a393779
- alternative location
- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S157086831630043X
- date added to LUP
- 2016-10-02 11:57:45
- date last changed
- 2022-03-01 07:57:19
@article{872b5c1c-ece6-422a-8888-1d988a393779, abstract = {{This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms (i.e., game trees) and proof trees. Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed.}}, author = {{Jacot, Justine and Genot, Emmanuel and Zenker, Frank}}, issn = {{1570-8683}}, keywords = {{Pragma-dialectics; Game semantics; Logic}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{105--128}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, series = {{Journal of Applied Logic}}, title = {{From reasonable preferences, via argumentation, to logic}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2016.08.001}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jal.2016.08.001}}, volume = {{18}}, year = {{2016}}, }