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A problem for confirmation theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy

Jönsson, Martin LU and Assarsson, Elias LU (2016) In Philosophical Studies 173(2). p.437-449
Abstract
This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the paper explores four different ways for the confirmation theorist to come to terms with the problem, and argues that none of them are successful.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Conjunction fallacy, Inverse conjunction fallacy, Bayesian epistemology, Bayesian confirmation theory, Formal measures of confirmation
in
Philosophical Studies
volume
173
issue
2
pages
437 - 449
publisher
Springer Netherlands
external identifiers
  • wos:000368225000010
  • scopus:84955180703
ISSN
0031-8116
DOI
10.1007/s11098-015-0500-7
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
9297df8b-dfb6-4b6f-ae51-58587b6cc739 (old id 8739164)
date added to LUP
2016-02-23 10:51:05
date last changed
2017-01-01 05:46:50
@article{9297df8b-dfb6-4b6f-ae51-58587b6cc739,
  abstract     = {This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the paper explores four different ways for the confirmation theorist to come to terms with the problem, and argues that none of them are successful.},
  author       = {Jönsson, Martin and Assarsson, Elias},
  issn         = {0031-8116},
  keyword      = {Conjunction fallacy,Inverse conjunction fallacy,Bayesian epistemology,Bayesian confirmation theory,Formal measures of confirmation},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {437--449},
  publisher    = {Springer Netherlands},
  series       = {Philosophical Studies},
  title        = {A problem for confirmation theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0500-7},
  volume       = {173},
  year         = {2016},
}