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Overlapping multiple object assignments

Kratz, Jörgen LU (2017) In Economic Theory 63(3). p.723-753
Abstract
This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple object assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers. Agents have complete, transitive and strict preferences over bundles of objects. A rule assigns objects to agents. A single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the agents satisfy a compatibility constraint. If no restrictions are imposed on the compatibility structure, there exists no rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and compatibility-monotonicity. Imposing two restrictions on the compatibility structure, the class of rules called compatibility-sorting sequential dictatorships can be fully characterized by four different combinations of group-strategyproofness, strategyproofness,... (More)
This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple object assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers. Agents have complete, transitive and strict preferences over bundles of objects. A rule assigns objects to agents. A single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the agents satisfy a compatibility constraint. If no restrictions are imposed on the compatibility structure, there exists no rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and compatibility-monotonicity. Imposing two restrictions on the compatibility structure, the class of rules called compatibility-sorting sequential dictatorships can be fully characterized by four different combinations of group-strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, compatibility-monotonicity and compatibility-invariance. It is demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (J Public Econ Theory 3:258–271, 2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained as a special case of the main result. Finally, some additional properties are considered and an extension of the model introducing capacity constraints is presented. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
overlapping assignments, sharable goods, sequential dictatorship, compatibility
in
Economic Theory
volume
63
issue
3
pages
31 pages
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:84975690909
  • wos:000395196200005
ISSN
1432-0479
DOI
10.1007/s00199-016-0958-3
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
91207553-51c2-4fb4-b167-acba5ef7b1ba (old id 8820960)
date added to LUP
2016-03-01 09:58:36
date last changed
2018-01-07 04:10:03
@article{91207553-51c2-4fb4-b167-acba5ef7b1ba,
  abstract     = {This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple object assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers. Agents have complete, transitive and strict preferences over bundles of objects. A rule assigns objects to agents. A single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the agents satisfy a compatibility constraint. If no restrictions are imposed on the compatibility structure, there exists no rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and compatibility-monotonicity. Imposing two restrictions on the compatibility structure, the class of rules called compatibility-sorting sequential dictatorships can be fully characterized by four different combinations of group-strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, compatibility-monotonicity and compatibility-invariance. It is demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (J Public Econ Theory 3:258–271, 2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained as a special case of the main result. Finally, some additional properties are considered and an extension of the model introducing capacity constraints is presented.},
  author       = {Kratz, Jörgen},
  issn         = {1432-0479},
  keyword      = {overlapping assignments,sharable goods,sequential dictatorship,compatibility},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {03},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {723--753},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Economic Theory},
  title        = {Overlapping multiple object assignments},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0958-3},
  volume       = {63},
  year         = {2017},
}