Strategyproof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
(2002) In Economic Theory 20(3). p.483502 Abstract
 Which strategyproof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with strategyproofness and nonbossiness. Under various additional assumptions  neutrality, individual rationality, object efficiency, weak decentralization  the distribution of the divisible good is further restricted. For instance, under neutrality the outcome of the mechanism can have only one distribution, which is hence independent of individual preferences. In this case the mechanism becomes serially dictatorial. On the other hand, individual rationality leads to a fixed... (More)
 Which strategyproof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with strategyproofness and nonbossiness. Under various additional assumptions  neutrality, individual rationality, object efficiency, weak decentralization  the distribution of the divisible good is further restricted. For instance, under neutrality the outcome of the mechanism can have only one distribution, which is hence independent of individual preferences. In this case the mechanism becomes serially dictatorial. On the other hand, individual rationality leads to a fixed price equilibrium with a welldefined rationing method (Gale's toptrading cycle procedure). (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/892568
 author
 Svensson, LarsGunnar ^{LU} and Larsson, B
 organization
 publishing date
 2002
 type
 Contribution to journal
 publication status
 published
 subject
 keywords
 indivisible object, strategyproof, nonbossy, housing market
 in
 Economic Theory
 volume
 20
 issue
 3
 pages
 483  502
 publisher
 Springer
 external identifiers

 wos:000178722500003
 scopus:0036026162
 ISSN
 14320479
 DOI
 10.1007/s001990100232
 language
 English
 LU publication?
 yes
 id
 905c1bff042148a6afd876fdc0f1af16 (old id 892568)
 date added to LUP
 20080123 16:37:29
 date last changed
 20180107 05:17:46
@article{905c1bff042148a6afd876fdc0f1af16, abstract = {Which strategyproof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with strategyproofness and nonbossiness. Under various additional assumptions  neutrality, individual rationality, object efficiency, weak decentralization  the distribution of the divisible good is further restricted. For instance, under neutrality the outcome of the mechanism can have only one distribution, which is hence independent of individual preferences. In this case the mechanism becomes serially dictatorial. On the other hand, individual rationality leads to a fixed price equilibrium with a welldefined rationing method (Gale's toptrading cycle procedure).}, author = {Svensson, LarsGunnar and Larsson, B}, issn = {14320479}, keyword = {indivisible object,strategyproof,nonbossy,housing market}, language = {eng}, number = {3}, pages = {483502}, publisher = {Springer}, series = {Economic Theory}, title = {Strategyproof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990100232}, volume = {20}, year = {2002}, }