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Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU and Larsson, B (2002) In Economic Theory 20(3). p.483-502
Abstract
Which strategy-proof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with strategy-proofness and nonbossiness. Under various additional assumptions - neutrality, individual rationality, object efficiency, weak decentralization - the distribution of the divisible good is further restricted. For instance, under neutrality the outcome of the mechanism can have only one distribution, which is hence independent of individual preferences. In this case the mechanism becomes serially dictatorial. On the other hand, individual rationality leads to a fixed... (More)
Which strategy-proof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with strategy-proofness and nonbossiness. Under various additional assumptions - neutrality, individual rationality, object efficiency, weak decentralization - the distribution of the divisible good is further restricted. For instance, under neutrality the outcome of the mechanism can have only one distribution, which is hence independent of individual preferences. In this case the mechanism becomes serially dictatorial. On the other hand, individual rationality leads to a fixed price equilibrium with a well-defined rationing method (Gale's top-trading cycle procedure). (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
indivisible object, strategy-proof, nonbossy, housing market
in
Economic Theory
volume
20
issue
3
pages
483 - 502
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • wos:000178722500003
  • scopus:0036026162
ISSN
1432-0479
DOI
10.1007/s001990100232
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
905c1bff-0421-48a6-afd8-76fdc0f1af16 (old id 892568)
date added to LUP
2008-01-23 16:37:29
date last changed
2017-02-19 03:26:41
@article{905c1bff-0421-48a6-afd8-76fdc0f1af16,
  abstract     = {Which strategy-proof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with strategy-proofness and nonbossiness. Under various additional assumptions - neutrality, individual rationality, object efficiency, weak decentralization - the distribution of the divisible good is further restricted. For instance, under neutrality the outcome of the mechanism can have only one distribution, which is hence independent of individual preferences. In this case the mechanism becomes serially dictatorial. On the other hand, individual rationality leads to a fixed price equilibrium with a well-defined rationing method (Gale's top-trading cycle procedure).},
  author       = {Svensson, Lars-Gunnar and Larsson, B},
  issn         = {1432-0479},
  keyword      = {indivisible object,strategy-proof,nonbossy,housing market},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {483--502},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Economic Theory},
  title        = {Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990100232},
  volume       = {20},
  year         = {2002},
}